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Abstract 
The current research examined reactions to subtle versus blatant expressions of prejudice. 
Across four studies, participants reported their recognition of prejudice, affective 
responses, and behavioural intentions resulting from expressions of subtle and blatant 
sexism and racism. In the first three studies, participants were presented with prototypical 
expressions of subtle and blatant prejudice that were not given any context. They were 
then asked to provide their reactions to these statements. Patterns of differential 
responding to subtle and blatant prejudice were observed, such that subtle prejudice was 
recognized as prejudice less than blatant prejudice, evoked less negative affect and less 
concern over discrimination potentially resulting, and participants had less intention to 
confront subtle prejudice than blatant prejudice. In the fourth study, subtle and blatant 
prejudice were used as explanations for a hiring decision. The same pattern of differential 
responding to subtle and blatant prejudice emerged, as hiring decisions based on subtle 
prejudice were viewed as more legitimate than hiring decisions based on blatant 
prejudice. Further, this differential pattern of responding was also observed for sexism 
compared to racism, with sexism less likely to be recognized than racism, and thus sexist 
hiring decisions perceived as more legitimate than racist hiring decisions. This research 
demonstrates that subtle expressions of prejudice, increasingly common in contemporary 
society, are likely to go unnoticed and therefore, unchallenged. 
Keywords: ambivalent sexism, discrimination, employment, equality, ethnicity, gender, 
old fashioned prejudice, race, racism, sexism, social norms, modern prejudice. 
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All Prejudices are not Created Equal: 
Different Responses to Subtle versus Blatant Expressions of Prejudice 
Let’s spare the lamentations for the so-called decline of feminism. The war for 
women’s rights is over. And we won…People who persist in looking for systemic 
discrimination against women in (name your field here) seem more and more 
desperate. They might as well complain about discrimination against male 
kindergarten teachers. We are finally learning that equality can also mean the 
freedom to make different choices (Wente, 2011, “For the Free, Educated and 
Affluent”). 
 Is this statement an example of prejudice? While research and theorizing on 
contemporary forms of prejudice would include this type of belief in definitions of 
prejudice, many people in society would not recognize it as such. The current research 
examines the differential recognition of more subtle, contemporary forms of prejudice 
compared to more blatant, traditional forms of prejudice and the outcomes resulting from 
this differential recognition I will begin by discussing current theorizing on contemporary 
prejudice, and summarizing the literature on differences in responding to and intentions 
to engage in collective action in response to subtle versus more blatant forms of 
prejudice. I will then discuss possible differences between sexism and racism and the 
responses these prejudices elicit, that may influence the differential responses to subtle 
and blatant prejudice. 
Contemporary Prejudice 
 Prejudice has traditionally been conceptualized as “an antipathy based upon a 
faulty and inflexible generalization” (Allport, 1954, p. 9). It has traditionally been used to 
  
2 
refer to the blatant antagonistic belief that a specific group is inferior in some 
stereotypical way (Ellemers & Barreto, 2009). Since the 1960s, civil rights activists have 
confronted inequality and discrimination, particularly inequality and discrimination on 
the basis of race and gender. This confrontation has resulted in far-reaching societal 
change, creating strong social norms against traditional blatant expressions of prejudice 
and discrimination (Czopp & Monteith, 2003; McConahay, 1986; Swim, Aiken, Hall, & 
Hunter, 1995). Indeed, even individuals who continue to endorse blatant prejudice appear 
to recognize that these attitudes are socially unacceptable as they are most commonly 
expressed in anonymous forums, such as the internet, or only to other people who are 
known to share the same views, reducing the potential social consequences for the 
prejudiced individual.  
 Even though many people now believe that prejudice and discrimination are a 
thing of the past, equality between different groups still does not exist in contemporary 
society (Ellemers & Barreto, 2009; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). Thus, one of the most 
notable effects of the social censure of prejudice in society has been not the elimination 
of prejudice and discrimination but rather the development of more subtle forms of 
prejudice and discrimination that are viewed as more acceptable (Barreto & Ellemers, 
2005a; Swim et al., 1995). It has been proposed that individuals may appear 
nonprejudiced superficially but still possess negative affect or beliefs about minority 
groups, such as racial minorities and women. Despite not being blatant, these attitudes 
can still support discrimination (Swim et al., 1995). 
 Although research demonstrates that prejudice influences the treatment, 
evaluation, and opportunities available to minority groups in society, initiatives that 
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attempt to enhance opportunities for particular social groups are often considered 
unnecessary and unfair, and are challenged (Ellemers & Barreto, 2009). Thus, there does 
not seem to be strong support, among either minority or dominant group members, for 
taking action to confront prejudice as it exists today (Becker & Wright, 2011; Ellemers & 
Barreto, 2009). 
 Forms of subtle prejudice that have been examined in the literature include 
modern racism and sexism, in contrast to blatant old-fashioned racism and sexism 
(McConahay, 1986; Swim et al., 1995), as well as benevolent sexism in comparison to 
blatant hostile sexism (Glick & Fiske, 1996). 
 Old-Fashioned and Modern Prejudice. The concepts of modern and old-
fashioned sexism (Swim et al., 1995) are parallel the concepts of modern and old-
fashioned racism (McConahay, 1986). Both old-fashioned and modern racists and sexists 
hold prejudicial attitudes toward the target group that can contribute to discriminatory 
behaviour. However, modern prejudice is expressed in subtle ways, presumably 
stemming from normative societal pressures to behave in a non-prejudicial manner 
(Barreto & Ellemers, 2005a).  
 The term ‘prejudice’ has traditionally been used to refer to the blatant antagonistic 
beliefs about certain groups. This corresponds to the current idea of old-fashioned 
prejudice (Ellemers & Barreto, 2009). Old-fashioned prejudice is a blatant expression of 
the belief that women or racial minorities are inferior to men or Whites (Barreto & 
Ellemers, 2005a). However, because it is now considered unacceptable to have blatantly 
prejudiced attitudes, people often avoid expressing these blatant beliefs and instead 
express more subtle forms of prejudice, such as modern prejudice (Ellemers & Barreto, 
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2009). Modern prejudice involves the beliefs that gender or racial discrimination are 
things of the past and that efforts to improve the status of women and racial minorities are 
thus misplaced (Barreto & Ellemers, 2005a). The specific beliefs that underlie modern 
sexism and racism are similar. These beliefs consist of denial of continuing 
discrimination directed toward women or racial minorities, antagonism toward women’s 
or racial minorities’ demands for equal rights, and resentment of special favours for 
women and racial minorities (Sears, 1988; Swim et al., 1995). 
 While there are social pressures to suppress old-fashioned prejudicial beliefs, 
people may resent racial minorities and women because these groups have engaged in 
efforts to reduce discrimination and gain economic and political power, which reduces 
the privilege experienced by dominant groups (i.e., Whites and males). Therefore, while 
people may reject blatant antipathy and old-fashioned prejudice toward racial minorities 
and women, they may still feel antagonistic toward these groups, which is expressed 
more subtly through modern prejudice (Swim et al., 1995). 
 While on the surface, it may appear that old-fashioned and modern prejudice 
represent distinct attitudes toward a target group, it has been proposed that they actually 
reflect the same underlying prejudicial belief of a target group’s inferiority. This is 
blatantly expressed in old-fashioned prejudice, but it is also expressed in modern 
prejudice, although more subtly (Barreto & Ellemers, 2005a). Modern prejudice conveys 
the belief that a particular group is inferior indirectly by refusing to acknowledge group-
based disadvantage and discrimination. While statistics demonstrate that there are 
systematic inequalities in outcomes between groups, individuals who are high in modern 
prejudice suggest that these differential outcomes are not due to discrimination, thereby 
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implying that disadvantaged groups are inferior in some way that makes them less 
deserving (Ellemers & Barreto, 2009). Given the existing differences in achievement in 
society between men and women, and between Whites and racial minorities, asserting 
that women and racial minorities have equal opportunities and are not discriminated 
against implies that the lack of success and achievement among women or racial 
minorities must be a result of their inferior abilities, efforts, or choices. The belief that 
unequal outcomes fairly reflect group differences demonstrates a prejudicial attitude 
toward groups believed to be inferior (Barreto & Ellemers, 2005a). Thus, the 
unwillingness to believe that prejudice still exists in contemporary society is a form of 
prejudice in itself (Ellemers & Barreto, 2009). 
 Despite changes in society and the influx of women into the workforce, most 
women still hold lower status jobs than do men (Swim et al., 1995). This job segregation 
limits women’s opportunities to advance in their careers, and reduces their economic 
power. Many people underestimate this employment segregation, however. Modern 
sexism is related to perceptions of segregation by gender in the workforce. Individuals 
who are modern sexists believe that discrimination no longer exists and thus they do not 
perceive barriers to women in male-dominated fields. This misperception results in less 
perception of a need for and less support of attempts to achieve equality for women 
(Swim et al., 1995). Individuals who are high in modern sexism are more likely than 
individuals who are low in modern sexism to attribute the low number of women in male-
dominated occupations to biological gender differences, rather than discrimination and 
prejudice. These differing explanations in turn influence support for organizations 
attempting to address gender-related issues. People who are higher in modern sexism 
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have different perceptions from those low in modern sexism of women’s experiences, 
therefore perceiving greater equality than actually exists. They are also more likely to 
attribute any inequality they do perceive to individualistic causes, such as biological 
differences, rather than discrimination or prejudice. These perceptions can lead to less 
support for social and political initiatives intended to promote women’s equality (Swim et 
al., 1995). 
 Modern prejudice beliefs have been interpreted in terms of their connection to a 
meritocratic ideology (Barreto & Ellemers, 2005a). Women who are exposed to old-
fashioned sexism report stronger gender identification than women exposed to modern 
sexism. This suggests that modern sexism and the meritocracy ideology implied by denial 
of discrimination makes people think of themselves as separate individuals rather than as 
members of a group, and thus they are less likely to perceive unfair group-level 
deprivation (Ellemers & Barreto, 2009). 
 Values of individualism and egalitarianism have also been shown to be related to 
racism and sexism (Swim et al., 1995). Endorsement of individualistic values and non-
endorsement of egalitarianism is associated with greater old-fashioned and modern 
racism and sexism. Individualistic values include an emphasis on personal freedom, self-
reliance, achievement, dedication to work, and discipline. These values support modern 
racism and sexism by suggesting that inequalities should be attributed to internal factors, 
such as motivation or ability, rather than external factors, such as discrimination. On the 
other hand, egalitarian values place an emphasis on helping other groups so that none is 
advantaged or disadvantaged. These values reduce modern prejudice because they lead to 
more support for the rights of minority groups. Individualistic values such as the 
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Protestant Work Ethic are more predictive of modern racism and sexism than old 
fashioned racism and sexism (Swim et al., 1995). 
 Ambivalent Sexism. It has been proposed that sexism is not simply an antipathy 
toward women, but rather reflects ambivalent attitudes toward women. Gender 
stereotypes, unlike many other prejudicial stereotypes, can be positive in tone, as well as 
negative (Eagly & Mladinic, 1989; Glick & Fiske, 1996). However, these stereotypes still 
contribute to discrimination because women are only seen as superior to men in ways that 
assert women’s dependence on men, or in domains that do not enhance women’s status 
relative to men, such as domestic roles (Glick & Fiske, 1996). 
 Although sexism has traditionally been conceptualized as hostility toward women, 
it has been suggested that an important component of sexism is subjectively positive 
feelings toward women that coexist with and support sexist antipathy (Glick & Fiske, 
1996). Glick & Fiske (1996) proposed the concept of ambivalent sexism, consisting of 
hostile sexism, which represents the traditional conception of sexism, as well as 
benevolent sexism, which is defined as attitudes toward women that are subjectively 
positive but are inherently sexist because they represent women stereotypically and 
restrict them to lower status roles, such as traditional wives dependent on their husbands 
to provide for them and protect them. Benevolent sexism also elicits positive behaviours 
such as prosocial or intimacy-seeking behaviour. However, benevolent sexism is not 
considered a truly positive attitude because it is based on traditional stereotyping and 
male dominance (Glick & Fiske, 1996). 
 Benevolent sexism represents an ideology of protecting women, reverence for 
wives and mothers, and idealization of women as romantic love objects (Glick & Fiske, 
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1996). Even though this seems to be a positive view of women, fundamentally it is based 
on the same beliefs as hostile sexism. Benevolent sexism, like hostile sexism, includes 
beliefs that limit women to domestic roles and that women are the weaker sex, inferior to 
men and needing their protection. Thus, hostile sexism and benevolent sexism both 
support and justify men’s greater structural power relative to women’s. Hostile sexism 
asserts that women are incompetent at agentic tasks, characterizing them as unable to 
exercise economic, legal, or political power. Correspondingly, benevolent sexism 
rationalizes restricting women to domestic roles by asserting that they are ideally suited 
to these roles. Thus, hostile and benevolent sexism work in concert to exclude women 
from high status roles and confine them to lower status positions (Glick & Fiske, 1996). 
As such, benevolent sexism legitimizes hostile sexism and subtly supports men’s 
dominance over women (Glick & Fiske, 1996). 
 Further, ambivalent sexism may be expressed as a division of women into 
subgroups who adhere to traditional subordinate roles, such as housewives, and are 
therefore liked, and  subgroups who challenge or threaten men’s dominance, such as 
feminists, and are therefore disliked. Thus, this differentiation allows for the justification 
of sexist attitudes as non-prejudiced because only certain subgroups of women are 
disliked rather than women as a whole (Glick, Diebold, Bailey-Werner, & Zhu, 1997; 
Glick & Fiske, 1996). 
 Despite the positive affect associated with benevolent sexism, it is associated with 
a number of negative outcomes for women, including endorsement of gender stereotypes 
and greater endorsement of other forms of sexism, such as old-fashioned and modern 
sexism (Glick & Fiske, 1996), as well as contributing to sexual harassment (Fiske & 
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Glick, 1995), blaming rape victims (Abrams, Vicki, Masser & Bohner, 2003), and 
legitimizing domestic violence (Sakalli, 2002). 
 Even with these consequences, benevolent sexism is a more subtle form of 
prejudice because the positive feelings, prosocial behaviour, and intimacy-seeking 
behaviour associated with benevolent sexism do not correspond to typical conceptions of 
prejudice. Similar “benevolent” racist ideologies have been used in the past to justify 
slavery and colonialism. These racist ideologies, like ambivalent sexist ideologies, 
combine ideas of a group’s lack of competence, in order to exploit them, with self-
serving justifications that allow the dominant group to rationalize their treatment of the 
exploited group as being non-exploitative (Glick & Fiske, 1996).  
Responses to Traditional and Contemporary Prejudice 
 Despite the extensive research and theorizing on contemporary forms of 
prejudice, very little research has directly compared individuals’ responses to subtle 
versus blatant forms of prejudice. However, a small number of studies have explored 
differences in responding to subtle and blatant sexism. 
 Responses to Old-Fashioned and Modern Sexism. It has been suggested that 
the specific form of prejudice may act as a cue that facilitates or inhibits detection of 
prejudice. Thus, old-fashioned prejudice is easily detected, but perception of the 
underlying prejudice in modern forms of sexism or racism is inhibited (Barreto & 
Ellemers, 2005a). 
 Barreto and Ellemers (2005a) examined how recognition of modern sexism 
compared to recognition of old-fashioned sexism, as well as the affective and behavioural 
consequences of being exposed to these views. They presented individuals with 
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prejudicial beliefs and told them that these beliefs were prevalent in society. Rather than 
examine the responses of individuals who were directly discriminated against, they 
looked at the reactions of general members of the negatively stereotyped group, as well 
as those of members of the dominant group. 
 In this study participants read what they were told were the results of a survey of 
public opinion on the position of women in society. Some participants were told that they 
were viewing the general attitudes of women, while others were told that they were 
viewing men’s attitudes. In the old-fashioned sexism condition, participants were told 
that most of the people surveyed agreed with a number of statements that represented 
items on the old-fashioned sexism scale. In the modern sexism condition, participants 
were told that most people surveyed agreed with statements representing items in the 
denial of continuing discrimination against women component of the modern sexism 
scale (Barreto & Ellemers, 2005a). 
 Individuals reported stronger support for modern than old-fashioned sexism, 
which was interpreted as indicating that modern sexism is more acceptable. Beliefs about 
perceived acceptability were not directly assessed, however. As well, while men agreed 
more strongly than women with old-fashioned sexism, men and women similarly agreed 
with modern sexism, demonstrating that women may not identify it as a negative attitude 
that disadvantages them to the same extent that old-fashioned sexism does. Similarly, 
women viewed old fashioned sexism as more prejudicial than modern sexism, whereas 
men considered these types of sexism equally prejudicial. Consistent with these 
perceptions, old-fashioned sexism elicited more hostility than modern sexism. A different 
pattern was observed for anxiety, however, with women exhibiting more anxiety in 
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response to modern sexism, while men exhibited more anxiety in response to old-
fashioned sexism. Both men and women were also more likely to derogate another 
individual expressing old-fashioned sexism than modern sexism, although there were no 
differences in intention to protest the different types of prejudice (Barreto & Ellemers, 
2005a). 
 Further, participants were better able to identify both the old-fashioned and 
modern sexist statements as prejudiced when they were expressed by men rather than by 
women. However, their affective and behavioural responses did not differ depending on 
whether the sexism was expressed by men or women (Barreto & Ellemers, 2005a). This 
suggests that participants’ perceptions of the negativity of the sexist attitudes may not 
have varied depending on the gender of the individual expressing the attitudes. Instead, 
they define prejudice as negative attitudes and behaviours directed toward an outgroup, 
rather than negative attitudes towards one’s own group. 
 This study may have particular implications for confronting prejudice in 
contemporary society. Forms of prejudice that are more common today may be likely to 
persist because they are less likely to be challenged, despite the negative consequences 
that can still be a result of subtle forms of prejudice. 
 Reponses to Hostile and Benevolent Sexism. Given the negative consequences 
of benevolent sexism, it is important that it, along with hostile sexism, be confronted in 
order to reduce gender inequalities (Barreto & Ellemers, 2005b).  However, benevolent 
sexism also represents a subtle form of prejudice and may thus be less recognized as a 
form of prejudice and therefore less likely to be confronted and challenged than the more 
blatant, hostile form of sexism. This may occur because the perception of prejudice plays 
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a key role in determining responses to social inequalities. Individuals must view 
inequalities as being unfair or illegitimate before they will confront them (Barreto & 
Ellemers, 2005b; Schmitt & Branscombe, 2002). 
 Barreto and Ellemers (2005b) examined responses to benevolent and hostile sexist 
beliefs. In this study participants read a summary of an apparent survey of opinions of the 
position of women in society. Participants either read that people generally agreed with 
attitude statements representing hostile sexism or they read that people agreed with 
attitude statements corresponding to benevolent sexism (Barreto & Ellemers, 2005b). 
Barreto and Ellemers found that individuals who expressed benevolent sexism were 
perceived more positively and as less prejudiced than individuals who expressed hostile 
sexism. As well, participants felt less anger toward a benevolent sexist than a hostile 
sexist. Of interest, the effect of the type of sexism on perceived sexism was mediated by 
how positively the source of the sexism was perceived, and not by anger. This supports 
the supposition that a positive evaluation of a benevolent sexist individual, rather than a 
lack of anger toward the individual, hinders the perception of the individual as prejudiced 
(Barreto & Ellemers, 2005b). 
 Barreto and Ellemers (2005b) suggested that matching a mental prototype of a 
sexist person is an important psychological process for identifying benevolent sexism as 
prejudice. They proposed that identifying an individual who expresses prejudice as sexist 
requires a comparison between that individual and the mental prototype of a sexist 
person. Individuals who are sources of hostile sexism fit the mental prototype of a sexist 
and are therefore perceived as sexist more easily than an individual who does not fit the 
mental prototype (Barreto & Ellemers, 2005b). Given that benevolent sexists are viewed 
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more positively than hostile sexists (Killianski & Rudman, 1998), this positive evaluation 
is inconsistent with the prototype of sexist individuals, who are imagined as unlikeable 
people (Barreto & Ellemers, 2005b). 
 Since benevolent sexists are less likely to be recognized as holding sexist views 
because they are evaluated relatively positively, deviating from the prototype of a sexist 
individual, there may be important implications for the adverse consequences of 
prejudice as it exists in contemporary society. The findings suggest that subtle forms of 
prejudice, including both modern and benevolent sexism, are more likely to remain 
unchallenged in our society because they are not recognized as prejudice. Another 
important consequence of the lack of recognition of subtle prejudice is that this may limit 
social support that victims of prejudice receive if they attempt to challenge individuals 
who hold sexist views. Although collective action can be engaged in by a single 
individual (Wright, 2010), social support is often required, and as a result, the most 
common forms of prejudice in contemporary society may be the least likely to be 
confronted and protested (Barreto & Ellemers, 2005b). 
Collective Action to Reduce Prejudice 
 One of the most important actions which individuals can take in response to 
prejudice is to challenge it. Given the different responses to subtle and blatant sexism, 
there is reason to expect that there may be different actions to challenge subtle versus 
blatant prejudice. Again, although there is little research directly comparing collective 
action in response to subtle versus blatant prejudice, there is some research exploring 
collective action in response to subtle or blatant sexism. 
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 There are generally two forms of action in which individuals can engage in 
response to social inequality, including individual action and collective action (Becker & 
Wright, 2011; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Individual action includes attempts to improve 
one’s own outcomes, often by distancing oneself from a disadvantaged group, whereas 
collective action focuses on efforts to improve the outcomes for one’s entire group 
(Becker & Wright, 2011; Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddon, 1990). Thus, collective action is 
defined by the intended beneficiary, rather than the number of participants, and can 
therefore be engaged in by a single individual as long as it is intended to benefit a 
disadvantaged group, not just the specific individual (Wright, 2010). Collective action is 
proposed to be a more effective strategy to reduce inequality and discrimination, as it 
improves the status of a disadvantaged group, whereas individual action does not 
challenge the group’s unequal status (Becker & Wright, 2011). 
 Collective Action in Response to Old-Fashioned and Modern Sexism. It has 
been stated that prejudice has to first be perceived before it can be challenged as an 
illegitimate source of social inequalities (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Thus, the recognition of 
prejudice, particularly recognition of being a victim of prejudice, is an important step 
before challenging prejudice, particularly through collection action (Barreto & Ellemers, 
2005a; Becker & Wright, 2011). The conviction that group outcomes are unfair, not just 
unfavourable, leads to anger at the injustice, motivating people to engage in collective 
action. This emergence of awareness that collective action is necessary is not often 
studied in the current literature, which examines people’s willingness to join pre-existing 
collective action. If there is an organization already formed or a protest activity already 
ongoing, the injustice is already clear to some people and may serve as a cue to others so 
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they don’t need to identify the need for collective action themselves from the inequality 
alone (Ellemers & Barreto, 2009). 
 The contemporary forms in which prejudice is expressed can inhibit people from 
engaging in collection action. Prejudice today is expressed in subtle ways that make it 
more difficult to recognize discrimination, and recognition and acknowledgement of 
discrimination and unjust treatment is an important first step before people will engage in 
protest or collective action (Ellemers & Barreto, 2009). Ellemers and Barreto (2009) 
suggest that because subtle modern sexism is not perceived as prejudice to the same 
extent as blatant old-fashioned sexism, and therefore individuals experience less anger in 
response to it, they will be less willing to protest or engage in collective action in 
response to modern sexism. Since modern expressions of prejudice are more difficult to 
recognize as prejudice, poor outcomes for a group or for individual members of a group 
are more likely to be attributed to inferiority and a lack of deservingness of particular 
individuals (Barreto & Ellemers, 2005a; Ellemers & Barreto, 2009). Therefore modern 
prejudice is seen as legitimate and not requiring action to change (Ellemers & Barreto, 
2009). 
 In a series of studies, Ellemers and Barreto (2009) examined support for 
collective action in response to modern and old-fashioned sexism. In one study, 
participants viewed supposed results of a survey of opinions about work and workplaces. 
These opinions demonstrated either old-fashioned sexism or modern sexism. In two 
subsequent studies participants read opinions apparently held by a student supervisor, by 
whom they were told that they would potentially be supervised. These opinions again 
expressed either old-fashioned or modern sexism. 
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 As expected, results of these studies indicated that an individual expressing 
modern sexism was perceived as less sexist than an individual expressing old-fashioned 
sexism, and modern sexism elicited less anger and less support for collective action in 
favour of women than did old-fashioned sexism. Most significantly, mediation analyses 
demonstrated that the limited perception of modern sexism as prejudice minimized anger 
toward the sexist individual, which in turn reduced support for collective action. Notably, 
protest behaviour in response to old-fashioned sexism tended to address the treatment of 
the whole group, rather than just focusing on individual outcomes, and therefore modern 
sexism reduced the propensity to engage in collective action specifically, rather than 
protest actions in general. There was no relation observed between the perception of 
sexism and individual protest (Ellemers & Barreto, 2009). 
 Overall, these findings demonstrate that because modern sexism is more subtle 
and difficult to identify as prejudice, people who are exposed to modern prejudice are 
less likely to identify that a group is being treated unfairly and therefore less motivated to 
engage in action to address the treatment of the group. Thus, modern sexism can allow 
inequality in contemporary society to remain stable and resilient to change (Ellemers & 
Barreto, 2009). 
 Collective Action in Response to Hostile and Benevolent Sexism. Similar to 
modern sexism, benevolent sexism is also less recognized as prejudice and therefore may 
also result in less motivation to engage in collective action. Given that the recognition of 
illegitimate inequality and resulting anger are key to the decision to engage in collective 
action (Barreto & Ellemers, 2005a; Becker & Wright, 2011) it has been suggested that 
benevolent sexism may undermine motivation for collective action by creating a 
  
17 
perception that women are advantaged and by representing men as supportive and caring 
toward women (Becker & Wright, 2011). 
 Becker and Wright (2011) proposed that benevolent sexism increases gender-
specific system justification (i.e., support for current relations and division of power 
between men and women), strengthens the perception of individual advantages from 
being a woman, and elicits positive affect, all of which combine to reduce collective 
action. On the other hand, due to the antagonistic nature of hostile sexism, they proposed 
that hostile sexism decreases system justification, reduces perceptions of the advantages 
of being a woman, and elicits negative affect. 
 It was found that exposure to benevolent sexist statements decreased intentions to 
engage in collective action, whereas exposure to hostile sexist statements increased 
collective action intentions. This effect was mediated by increases in gender-specific 
system justification and in the perceived advantages of being a woman in response to 
benevolent sexism and the corresponding decrease in response to hostile sexism. Further, 
the increased system justification and perceived advantages in response to benevolent 
sexism appeared to be a result of exposure specifically to favourable beliefs that are 
common stereotypes of women, such as the beliefs inherent in benevolent sexism, rather 
than just general favourable beliefs about women (Becker & Wright, 2011). 
 Additionally, exposure to benevolent or hostile sexism influenced not only 
collective action intentions, but also actual participation in collective action (Becker & 
Wright, 2011). Women exposed to benevolent sexism were less likely to engage in 
gender-related collective action, such as signing a petition or distributing flyers, whereas 
women exposed to hostile sexism were more likely to engage in both these behaviours. 
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Exposure to benevolent sexism increased system justification, perceived advantages, and 
positive affect, which together resulted in reduced participation in activities such as 
petition signing and flyer distribution. Conversely, hostile sexism decreased system 
justification and perceived advantages, as well as increased negative affect, which 
together led to greater participation in collective action (Becker & Wright, 2011). 
 Thus, benevolent sexism can have a serious negative impact on motivation and 
intentions to engage in collective action to improve women’s status. People will engage 
in collective action in response to behaviour that is recognized as prejudiced, such as 
hostile sexism. Therefore, it may be the limited recognition of prejudice in benevolent 
sexism that allows the belief that it confers benefits to women to persist and undermines 
collective action. Efforts to increase awareness of the negative consequences of 
benevolent sexism then have the potential to be very effective in increasing recognition 
of prejudice in benevolent sexism and thus engagement in gender-related collective 
action. Further, this may additionally apply for other stigmatized groups toward whom 
paternalistic attitudes are held (Becker & Wright, 2011). 
Similarities and Differences between Racism and Sexism 
 To date, responses to subtle and blatant prejudice have only been directly 
compared for sexism. Thus, there is no evidence that this distinction would be apparent 
with other targets of prejudice such as racial or ethnic groups. Sexism has many parallels 
with other forms of prejudice, but there is also evidence that sexism is in some ways 
unique among prejudices. 
 Research examining support for equality for racial minorities and women suggests 
the possibility of structural similarities between contemporary racism and sexism. Fewer 
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people now support unequal treatment of Black people compared to White people or 
support women being limited to traditional roles (McConahay, 1986; Swim et al., 1995). 
Despite these more egalitarian attitudes, however, behaviour is still inconsistent with 
egalitarianism. For both race and gender, endorsement of equality does not correspond to 
changes in behaviour suggestive of equality. Fewer people than in the past explicitly 
endorse the unequal treatment of racial minorities or women, but inequality continues to 
persist. Further, parallel perceptions of racial minorities and women exist in cognitive 
processes, such as perceptual and memory biases, that can contribute to maintaining 
stereotypes and prejudices. For example, confirmation biases can maintain stereotypes 
and prejudices about both racial minorities and women (Swim et al., 1995). 
 However, gender stereotypes are more prescriptive than racial stereotypes. There 
is a common belief that women should conform to stereotypes about them, whereas there 
is not a  belief that racial minorities should behave in stereotypical ways (Czopp & 
Monteith, 2003). Further, gender stereotypes are more likely to be perceived as true and 
thus gender inequalities perceived as legitimate (Czopp & Monteith, 2003). Racism 
differs from sexism today in that it is no longer considered acceptable to view racial 
differences as due to real differences between races, while the belief still persists that 
current gender differences are legitimate because they reflect objective differences 
between men and women. Thus, unlike racial differences, which are more commonly 
recognized as stemming from some races being more disadvantaged than others, there is 
limited recognition that men and women are not given equal opportunities in 
contemporary society (Barreto & Ellemers, 2005b). This may undermine perceptions of 
the seriousness of sexism (Czopp & Monteith, 2003). 
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 It has been proposed that as a result of these differences, social norms against 
racial prejudice are stronger than those against sexism (Czopp & Monteith, 2003). Racist 
hate speech is perceived as more offensive than sexist hate speech (Cowan & Hodge, 
1996) and discriminatory exclusion and derogation of Blacks by Whites is seen as more 
prejudicial than the exact same behaviour directed at women by men (Rodin, Price, 
Bryson, & Sanchez, 1990). 
 Czopp and Monteith (2003) examined responses to confrontation of a subtle 
transgression indicating a bias against Blacks or women. Transgressions were identical 
other than the target group. People felt more guilty and uncomfortable when they were 
confronted about racial bias rather than gender bias, whereas they felt more amused and 
condescending when they were confronted about a gender bias than about a racial bias. 
People were also more willing to apologize and change their behaviour, as well as 
express greater concern about upsetting and offending someone when they had exhibited 
racial bias rather than gender bias. Further, individuals who typically do not endorse 
blatant racism or sexism expressed more concern about racial bias than individuals who 
do endorse blatant racism or sexism, but expressed the same more limited concern about 
gender bias as did individuals who endorsed blatant prejudice. Thus, non-blatantly 
prejudiced individuals were not any more concerned about sexism than were blatantly 
prejudiced individuals. This was interpreted as suggesting that current social norms view 
sexism as less severe and more tolerable than racism (Czopp & Monteith, 2003). 
However, the findings could also be interpreted as demonstrating that people are less able 
to recognize prejudice in sexism than racism. 
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The Current Research 
 The literature to date provides insight into the processes involved in recognizing 
prejudice and engaging in collective action in response to prejudice. Several key 
questions remain unanswered, however. First, studies to date have examined responses to 
subtle and blatant prejudices that are presented within a context or scenario, such as 
survey results or attitudes expressed by a potential supervisor. Situational factors can 
affect the detection of prejudice (Major, Quinton, & McCoy, 2002). For example, 
contextual factors, such as if a male or female expresses a sexist belief, have been shown 
to influence recognition of and responding to the prejudice (Barreto & Ellemers, 2005). It 
is therefore worthwhile to examine whether responses to subtle and blatant prejudicial 
attitudes that are presented free of any context demonstrate the same pattern that has 
previously been observed. 
 Second, research to date has directly compared subtle and blatant sexism, but has 
not been extended to other forms of bias. That is, research has not demonstrated that the 
pattern of responses to subtle versus blatant sexism extend to different targets of 
prejudice. As discussed above, sexism differs from other prejudices in some important 
ways, resulting in some differing responses to sexism versus other forms of bias (e.g., 
Czopp & Monteith, 2003). Therefore, it cannot be assumed that responses observed for 
subtle and blatant sexism will also be observed for subtle and blatant forms of other 
prejudices, such as racism. 
 Third, no current studies have included information on the discriminatory 
outcomes of subtle prejudice. Individuals may expect subtle forms of prejudice to have 
less serious negative, or even positive, consequences (e.g., Becker & Wright, 2011). 
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Thus, the divergent responses to subtle and blatant prejudice may actually reflect 
responses to perceptions of less serious versus more serious discrimination. As a result, 
responses to subtle and blatant prejudice should be examined when the discriminatory 
outcomes resulting from these prejudices are explicitly defined as being identical. 
 The current research addresses these issues. Study 1 examines responses to 
standard expressions of subtle and blatant sexism (i.e., items included in sexism scales) 
presented without context. Thus, further information about context, such as who 
expressed the prejudice, for what reason it was expressed, the situation in which it was 
expressed, or the degree of support from other people for the statement, is not provided. 
Further, this study directly assesses perceptions of the societal acceptability of these 
attitudes, rather than inferring it from participants’ own agreement with these beliefs, and 
without providing information about others’ support for these attitudes. Study 2 extends 
the first study to the domain of racism, rather than sexism. Study 3 examines the beliefs 
individuals endorse regarding subtle and blatant prejudice to explore potential 
explanations behind reasoning about subtle and blatant prejudice and thus differential 
responding to these forms of prejudice. Finally, Study 4 examines responses to hiring 
discrimination based on subtle or blatant sexism or racism. Thus, in this study, the 
discriminatory outcomes of subtle and blatant prejudice are identical so that participants’ 
responses are based on the subtlety of the prejudice expressed rather than the expectation 
of better or worse outcomes resulting from different forms of prejudice. 
Study 1 
 This study examined responses to statements reflecting subtle and blatant sexist 
attitudes that were presented without context, eliminating the potential for a context to 
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influence judgements regarding the sexist statements. Based on prior research (e.g., 
Barreto & Ellemers, 2005a; 2005b; Becker & Wright 2011), it was expected that subtle 
forms of sexism, including modern sexism and benevolent sexism, would be less 
recognized as prejudice, and therefore would be confronted and challenged less than 
blatant forms of sexism, such as old-fashioned sexism and hostile sexism. 
Method 
 Participants. Participants were 56 introductory psychology students (11 male; 40 
female; 5 undisclosed) at the University of Western Ontario. Participants ranged in age 
from 17 to 40 years (M = 18.98, SD = 3.13). Most of the participants (66%, n = 36) self-
identified as white; 11% (n = 6) self-identified as Asian, 5% (n = 3) as East Indian, 2% (n 
= 1) as Hispanic, 2% (n = 1) as North American Indian, 4% (n = 2) as mixed ethnicity, 
and 4% (n = 2) as other. Five participants did not indicate their ethnicity. All participants 
received partial course credit for participating. 
 Materials and Procedure. Participants were recruited to participate in a study on 
“Understanding Social Attitudes.” Participants completed a computer-based 
questionnaire, in which they were presented with the items from the Old-Fashioned and 
Modern Sexism scales (Swim et al., 1995), as well as the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory 
(Glick & Fiske, 1996), which includes both hostile sexism and benevolent sexism. 
References to the “United States” were changed to “Canada” and any normally reverse 
scored items reworded to the sexist attitude (for example, “Women are just as capable of 
thinking logically as men” was reworded as, “Women are not as capable of thinking 
logically as men”). 
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 For each item presented, participants rated on several 7-point scales how the 
belief expressed by the item is viewed in society (appropriate, positive belief to hold, 
acceptable, encouraged, prejudice). For each of these scales, participants’ ratings for each 
attitude reflecting modern sexism were averaged to form an overall rating for modern 
sexism, and the same was done for old-fashioned sexism, benevolent sexism, and hostile 
sexism. Then the ratings for modern and benevolent sexism were averaged to obtain 
ratings for subtle sexism, and the ratings for old-fashioned and hostile sexism were 
averaged to obtain ratings for blatant sexism. 
 Next, participants rated the extent to which several positive and negative affective 
terms (happy, secure, content, angry, weak, indignant, tense, disappointed, sad; adapted 
from Barreto & Ellemers, 2005a) described how they felt in response to each item, again 
using a 7-point scale. Again, ratings for each item were combined to form ratings for 
subtle and blatant sexism. 
 For each item, participants also rated, on a 7-point scale, how likely they would 
be to respond to an individual who endorsed the expressed view in several ways (wish to 
speak to someone who holds this view, want to try to change the opinion of an individual 
with this view, try to understand why an individual would hold this view, expect to 
dislike an individual with this view, would be unwilling to collaborate with an individual 
who endorsed this view; adapted from Barreto & Ellemers, 2005a). Again these rating 
were aggregated to form ratings of subtle and blatant sexism. 
 Finally, participants answered a number of demographic items. 
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Results 
 Reliability. Based on factor analysis (PCA, Varimax Rotation; see Table 1) and 
reliability analysis, the ratings for appropriate, positive, acceptable, and encouraged were 
combined to form one measure of how positively the attitude is viewed in society (α = 
.85), and the ratings of how much the attitude reflects prejudice was analyzed separately. 
 Based on previous research (e.g., Barreto & Ellemers 2005a), factor analysis 
(PCA, Varimax Rotation; see Table 2), and reliability analysis, items were divided into 
three affect measures, with angry, indignant and disappointed reflecting hostility (α = 
.90), weak, tense and sad reflecting anxiety (α = .90), and happy, secure and content 
reflecting positive affect (α = .92). 
 Based on factor analysis (PCA, Varimax Rotation; see Table 3) and reliability 
analysis, speaking to the sexist individual and trying to understanding the sexist 
individual formed a measure of comprehension (α = .85), while trying to change the 
opinion of the individual, expecting to dislike the individual, and being unwilling to 
collaborate with the individual formed a measure of confrontation (α = .86).  
 Gender Effects. Gender of participants did not demonstrate any main effects or 
interactions for any of the dependent measures (all ps > .05) and was therefore excluded 
from the analyses shown here.
1
 
 Beliefs Regarding Societal Views of Sexist Attitudes. The different types of 
sexism were viewed as differentially acceptable in society
2
, with subtle sexism viewed   
                                                 
1
 Although power was low, allowing limited ability to statistically test for gender differences, examination 
of means demonstrated little difference between males and females. 
2
 Modern sexism was viewed as significantly more acceptable in society than old-fashioned sexism, t(49) = 
9.21, p < .001, and benevolent sexism was significantly more acceptable than hostile sexism, t(45) = 5.35, p 
< .001. 
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Table 1 
Rotated Component Matrix for Societal Views of Sexism Measures 
 1 2 
Appropriate .834 -.347 
Positive .843 -.341 
Acceptable .891 .196 
Encouraged .769 .488 
Prejudice -.071 .915 
 
Note. Bold indicates factor in which items were included for data analysis. 
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Table 2 
Rotated Component Matrix for Affect in Response to Sexism Measures 
 1 2 
Angry .947 -.137 
Indignant .823 .244 
Disappointed .946 -.148 
Weak .852 .179 
Tense .926 .130 
Sad .936 .025 
Happy -.073 .942 
Secure .356 .846 
Content -.063 .943 
 
Note. Bold indicates factor in which items were included for data analysis. Items ‘Weak’, 
‘Tense’, and ‘Sad’ were analyzed together for consistency with prior research. 
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Table 3 
Rotated Component Matrix for Response to Sexist Individual Measures 
 1 2 
Speak .184 .909 
Understand .104 .909 
Change Opinion .578 .662 
Dislike .947 .201 
Unwilling to 
Collaborate 
.960 .137 
 
Note. Bold indicates factor in which items were included for data analysis. 
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more favourably than blatant sexism, t(40) = 9.43, p < .001. Further, there were 
differences in the extent to which the two types of sexism were regarded as prejudice
3
. 
Subtle forms of sexism were less likely to be viewed as prejudice than blatant forms of 
sexism, t(47) = 8.39, p < .001 (see Figure 1). As well, blatant sexism was significantly 
above the scale mean of 4 for recognition of prejudice, t(51) = 5.42, p < .001, while 
subtle sexism was not significantly different from the scale mean, t(49) = -0.74, p = .46. 
 Affective Responses to Sexist Attitudes. Differences were observed in 
participants’ responses to different types of sexism for both hostility4 and anxiety5, as 
well as for positive affect
6
. Greater hostility was reported for the blatant forms of sexism 
than for subtle forms of sexism, t(41) = 8.01, p < .001. As well, greater anxiety was 
reported for the blatant forms of sexism than for subtle forms of sexism, t(34) = 5.45, p < 
.001. Correspondingly, greater positive affect was reported for the subtle forms of sexism 
than the blatant types, t(31) = 8.13, p < .001 (see Figure 2). 
 Responses to Sexist Individual. Participants reported different intentions in 
response to individuals expressing different types of sexism. Examining the aggregated 
measures of intentions in response to prejudice, it was found that participants reported 
differing intentions to attempt to comprehend why an individual would hold his or her  
                                                 
3
 Modern sexism was recognized as prejudice significantly less than old-fashioned sexism, t(52) = 10.61, p 
< .001. Benevolent and hostile sexism did not differ t(49) = 0.77, p = .444. 
4
 Old-fashioned sexism caused greater hostility than modern sexism, t(49) = 9.06, p < .001, and hostile 
sexism caused greater hostility than benevolent sexism, t(45) = 3.92, p < .001. 
5
 Old-fashioned sexism caused greater anxiety than modern sexism, t(41) = 5.60, p < .001, and hostile 
sexism caused greater anxiety than benevolent sexism, t(43) = 3.30, p = .005. 
6
 Old-fashioned sexism was associated with less positive affect than modern sexism, t(46) = 8.62, p < .001, 
and hostile sexism caused less positive affect than benevolent sexism, t(37) = 6.04, p < .001. 
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Figure 1. Societal acceptability and recognition of prejudicial attitudes for subtle and 
blatant sexism. 
Note. Responses were provided on a 1-7 scale. 
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Figure 2. Affective responses to subtle and blatant sexism. 
Note. Responses were provided on a 1-7 scale. 
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views
7
. They had a greater intention to attempt to comprehend the views of an individual 
who expressed blatant sexism than those who expressed subtle sexism, t(46) = 3.15, p =  
.003. Further, there were differences in individuals’ intentions to confront individuals 
who expressed different forms of sexism
8
. They had greater intention of confronting 
individuals who expressed blatant sexism than confronting individuals who expressed 
subtle sexism, t(44) = 7.70, p < .001 (see Figure 3). 
 Mediational Analysis. For the mediation analyses, type of prejudice was dummy 
coded (blatant = 0; subtle = 1). Analyses were performed to examine factors that may 
mediate the relation between the different forms of sexism and recognition of prejudice, 
including affect and perception of societal acceptability of attitudes. Additionally, inverse 
mediation models, in which the mediator and dependent variable were switched (i.e., 
recognition of prejudice mediated effect of type of prejudice on affect and perceived 
societal acceptability) were analyzed to further explore support for the proposed 
mediation model. Finally, the role of recognition of prejudice in mediating the relation 
between the type of prejudice and intended responses was also examined. 
 Role of affect in recognition of prejudice. Affect may be an important cue to 
trigger recognition of prejudice in different forms of sexism or it may be a result of 
recognizing prejudice. Individuals must view inequalities as being unfair before they will 
confront them (Barreto & Ellemers, 2005b), and affect in response to inequality may 
prompt individuals to view it as legitimate or prejudice. In first examining the potential 
                                                 
7
 Old-fashioned sexism caused greater intention to attempt to comprehend why views were held than 
modern sexism, t(50) = 3.79, p < .001. There was no significant difference between hostile sexism and 
benevolent sexism, t(50) = 0.35, p = .726. 
8
 Old-fashioned sexism caused greater intention to confront an individual than modern sexism, t(48) = 9.38, 
p < .001, and hostile sexism caused greater intention to confront than benevolent sexism, t(49) = 3.27, p = 
.002. 
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Figure 3. Intention to attempt to comprehend and confront a subtle or blatant sexist 
individual. 
Note. Responses were provided on a 1-7 scale. 
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
Comprehend Confront
Subtle
Blatant
  
34 
role of affect in mediating the relation between type of prejudice and recognition of 
prejudice, all three type of affect (hostility, anxiety, and positivity), were correlated with 
the type of prejudice (hostility: r = -.43, p < .001; anxiety: r = -.25, p = .020; positivity: r 
= .52, p < .001) as well as with recognition of prejudice (hostility: r = .62, p < .001; 
anxiety: r = .50, p = .020; positivity: r = -.22, p = .05) and therefore, qualified as potential 
mediators. When each was entered with type of prejudice in separate regression analyses, 
two types of affect - hostility (β = .55, t = 6.04, p < .001) and anxiety (β = .44, t = 4.58, p 
< .001) - predicted recognition of prejudice. However, positivity (β = -.01, t = 0.11, p = 
.911) did not predict recognition of prejudice when type of prejudice was included in the 
model. Consistent with full mediation, the effect of prejudice type on recognition of 
prejudice (r = -.41, p < .001) did not remain significant when it was entered in the 
regression equation with hostility (β = -.17, t = 1.88, p = .064). Consistent with partial 
mediation, the effect of prejudice type on recognition of prejudice remained significant 
when it was entered with anxiety, but was weaker than when it was considered as a lone 
predictor (β = -.26, t = 2.68, p = .009). Individual tests for mediation utilizing bootstrap 
estimation of indirect effects with 1000 replications (Preacher & Hayes, 2008) confirmed 
hostility as a full mediator and anxiety as a partial mediator, two-tailed ps < .05 (95% 
confidence interval (CI) for hostility indirect effect = -1.012, -.325; and anxiety = -.632, -
.046). Multiple mediation analyses considering both types of negative affect 
simultaneously revealed a significant full mediation effect for only hostility, p < .05 (95% 
CI for hostility indirect effect= -1.636, -.312; anxiety = -.085, .622). 
 Hostility may be an outcome of recognition of prejudice, rather than leading to 
recognition. To test this inverted model, additional analyses were performed. When 
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recognition of prejudice was entered in a regression equation with type of prejudice, it 
predicted hostility (β = .54, t = 6.04, p < .001). Consistent with partial mediation, the 
effect of prejudice type on hostility (r = -.43, p < .001) remained significant when it was 
entered with recognition of prejudice, but was weaker than when it was considered as a 
lone predictor (β = -.21, t = 2.33, p = .022). A test for mediation utilizing bootstrap 
estimation of indirect effects (1000 replications) confirmed recognition of prejudice as a 
partial mediator, two-tailed ps < .05 (95% CI for recognition of prejudice indirect effect 
= -.901, -.200). 
 Role of society in recognition of prejudice. The role of perceived acceptability of 
prejudicial attitudes in mediating the effect of different types of sexism on recognition of 
prejudice was also examined. In first examining the potential role of societal acceptability 
in mediating the relation between type of prejudice and recognition of prejudice, 
acceptability was correlated with the type of prejudice (r = .55, p < .001) but it did not 
correlate with recognition of prejudice (r = -.05, p = .64) and therefore, did not qualify as 
a potential mediator. Further, this also established that recognition of prejudice did not 
qualify as a mediator in the inverted model. 
 Consequences of prejudice recognition. The role of perceiving prejudice in 
mediating the effect of the different types of sexism on response intentions was also 
examined. In first examining the effect of recognition of prejudice on responses to an 
individual expressing a sexist belief, only confrontation correlated with the type of 
prejudice, while comprehension did not (confrontation: r = -.41, p < .001; 
comprehension: r = -.12, p = .219) and therefore, only confrontation demonstrated a 
relation with the type of prejudice which may have been mediated. Further examination 
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of the correlations revealed that participants’ recognition of prejudice correlated with the 
type of prejudice (r = -.41, p < .001) and therefore, qualified as a potential mediator. 
When it was entered with type of prejudice in a regression analysis, it predicted intention 
to confront a sexist individual (β = .40, t = 4.20, p < .001). Consistent with partial 
mediation, the effect of prejudice type on intentions to confront an individual (r = -.41, p 
< .001) remained significant when it was entered with recognition of prejudice, but was 
weaker than when it was considered as a lone predictor (β = -.25, t = 2.68, p = .009). 
Individual tests for mediation utilizing bootstrap estimation of indirect effects (1000 
replications) confirmed recognition of prejudice as a partial mediator between type of 
prejudice and intentions to confront an individual, two-tailed ps < .05 (95% CI for 
hostility indirect effect = -.619, -.133). 
 The inverse model of this mediation was not tested because conceptually it does 
not make sense for behavioural intentions to precede recognition of prejudice and 
mediate the effect of different forms of sexism on recognition of prejudice. 
Discussion 
 This study demonstrated that there are consistent differences between perceptions 
of blatant and subtle forms of sexism. Overall, participants demonstrated less negative 
responses to subtle sexism than to blatant sexism. Of importance, participants 
demonstrated limited recognition of subtle sexism as a prejudice, even potentially 
indicating that it was not prejudice, rather than just less prejudicial than blatant sexism. 
This corresponded to participants having more positive and less negative affective 
responses to subtle sexism than blatant sexism, believing that subtle sexism is more 
acceptable in society than blatant sexism, and having less intention to confront or attempt 
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to engage with a subtly sexist individual than a blatantly sexist individual. Extending on 
previous research (e.g., Barreto & Ellemers 2005a), this differential responding was 
observed when subtle and blatant sexist expressions were presented free of context, 
indicating that it is a result of the nature of the expressions themselves, rather than 
situationally dependent. 
 This study also suggested a serious consequence of the limited recognition of 
subtle sexism as prejudice, as the mediation analyses indicated that intentions to confront 
a sexist individual about his or her attitudes were partially a result of recognizing their 
attitudes as representing prejudice. Therefore, this indicates that subtle sexist attitudes 
may be allowed to persist in society as individuals are less likely to confront them. 
 In an attempt to explore what factors may influence recognition of prejudice, the 
relation of affect experienced in response to sexist attitudes and beliefs about societal 
acceptability were explored. Beliefs about societal acceptability appeared to be unrelated 
to recognition of prejudice. Interestingly, recognition of prejudice also did not lead to 
beliefs regarding an attitude’s acceptability in society. Affect, specifically hostility, may 
play a role in recognition of prejudice. However, it is unclear from this study whether 
experiencing hostility leads individuals to recognize that an attitude is prejudice or 
whether recognizing prejudice leads individuals to experience hostility. 
Study 2 
 This study extended the previous study by exploring whether the differences 
previously observed for responses to subtle versus blatant prejudice are a phenomenon 
unique to sexism or apply to other forms of prejudice. Sexism has been proposed to be 
unique among different forms of prejudice given the unique interconnection between the 
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sexes and the lack of segregation and social distance which is normally associated with 
other targets of prejudice (Glick & Fiske, 1996). Therefore, given the uniqueness of 
sexism, it is possible that differential responses to subtle and blatant prejudice only occur 
for sexism. The second study addressed this issue by extending the research to racism. 
Method 
 Participants. Participants were 53 introductory psychology students (26 male and 
27 female) at the University of Western Ontario. Participants ranged in age from 17 to 30 
years (M = 19.26, SD = 1.96). Most of the participants (78%, n = 41) self-identified as 
White; 9% (n = 5) self-identified as Asian, 4% (n = 2) as Black, 2% (n = 1) as North 
American Indian, and 7% (n = 4) as other. All participants received partial course credit 
for participating. 
 Materials and Procedure. As in Study 1, participants were again recruited to 
participate in a study on “Understanding Social Attitudes”. The procedure of Study 1 was 
directly replicated with sexism items replaced with racism items. As there is no racism 
equivalent to ambivalent sexism, subtle racism consisted solely of modern racism, and 
blatant racism consisted solely of old-fashioned racism. Participants were presented with 
the items from the old-fashioned and modern racism scales (McConahay, 1986). 
References to “blacks” were reworded to “racial minorities” and references to the 
“United States” were changed to “Canada”. As well, any reverse scored items were 
reworded to the racist attitude (for example, “It is easy to understand the anger of racial 
minorities in Canada” was reworded as, “It is difficult to understand the anger of racial 
minorities in Canada”). Participants rated each item on the same measures as in Study 1 
and they also completed a number of demographic items. 
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Results 
 Measure Reliabilities. As in Study 1, based on factor analysis (PCA, Varimax 
Rotation; see Table 4) and reliabilities, the ratings for how each item was viewed in 
society were combined to form ratings of the perceived positivity of each attitude in 
society (α = .88), while recognition of prejudice was analyzed separately. Also, based on 
previous research, factor analysis (PCA, Varimax Rotation; see Table 5), and reliabilities, 
affect items were again combined to form hostility (α = .79), anxiety (α = .70), and 
positive affect (α = .91). To remain consistent with Study 1, as well as based on factor 
analysis (PCA, Varimax Rotation; see Table 6) and reliabilities, the ratings for the 
responses to the prejudiced individual were combined into comprehension (α = .61), and 
confrontation (α = .87).  
 Race Effects. Race of participants did not demonstrate any main effects or 
interactions for any of the dependent measures (all ps > .05) and was therefore excluded 
from the analyses shown here.
9
 
 Beliefs Regarding Societal Views of Racist Attitudes. Different types of racism 
were viewed as differentially acceptable in society, with subtle modern racism viewed 
more positively than blatant old-fashioned racism, t(47) = 5.31, p < .001. 
Correspondingly, there was greater recognition of blatant racism as prejudice than there 
was of subtle racism, t(48) = 7.51, p < .001 (see Figure 4). When comparing ratings of 
blatant and subtle racism to the scale mean of 4, both blatant racism, t(51) = 11.66, p < 
.001, and subtle racism, t(49) = 4.65, p < .001, were significantly above the mean. 
                                                 
9
 Although power was low, allowing limited ability to statistically test for race differences, examination of 
means demonstrated little difference between White and non-White participants. 
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Table 4 
Component Matrix for Societal Views of Racism Measures 
 1 
Appropriate .910 
Positive .936 
Acceptable .875 
Encouraged .646 
Prejudice -.755 
 
Note. Bold indicates factor in which items were included for data analysis. 
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Table 5 
Rotated Component Matrix for Affect in Response to Racism Measures 
 1 2 
Angry -.141 .925 
Indignant .440 .562 
Disappointed -.084 .935 
Weak .681 .362 
Tense .450 .631 
Sad .180 .827 
Happy .943 -.027 
Secure .883 .109 
Content .922 -.072 
 
Note. Bold indicates factor in which items were included for data analysis. Items ‘Weak’, 
‘Tense’, and ‘Sad’ were analyzed together for consistency with prior research. 
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Table 6 
Rotated Component Matrix for Response to Racist Individual Measures 
 1 2 
Speak -.092 .845 
Understand .091 .834 
Change Opinion .834 .248 
Dislike .939 -.089 
Unwilling to 
Collaborate 
.916 -.124 
 
Note. Bold indicates factor in which items were included for data analysis. 
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Figure 4. Societal acceptability and recognition of prejudicial attitudes for subtle and 
blatant racism. 
Note. Responses were provided on a 1-7 scale. 
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 Affective Responses to Racist Attitudes. Greater hostility was reported for 
blatant old-fashioned racism than for subtle modern racism, t(43) = 6.45, p < .001. As 
well, greater anxiety was reported for blatant racism than for subtle racism, t(45) = 3.95, 
p < .001. Correspondingly, greater positive affect was reported for subtle racism than 
blatant racism, t(37) = 2.49, p = .017 (see Figure 5). 
 Responses to Racist Individuals. Participants reported different responses to 
individuals expressing different types of racism. They expressed less intention to attempt 
to comprehend why individuals would hold blatant old-fashioned racist views than subtle 
modern racist views, t(46) = 2.60, p = .013. They also expressed greater intention to 
confront an individual who expressed blatant racism than subtle racism, t(46) = 5.21, p = 
.013 (see Figure 6).  
 Mediational Analysis. For the mediation analyses, type of prejudice was dummy 
coded (blatant = 0; subtle = 1). Analyses were performed to examine factors that may 
mediate the relation between the different forms of racism and recognition of prejudice, 
including affect and perception of societal acceptability of attitudes. Additionally, inverse 
mediation models, in which the mediator and dependent variable were switched, were 
analyzed to further explore support for the proposed mediation model. Finally, the role of 
recognition of prejudice in mediating the relation between the type of prejudice and 
intended responses was also examined. 
 Role of affect in recognition of prejudice. Affect may be an important cue to 
trigger recognition of prejudice in different forms of racism or it may be a result of 
recognizing prejudice. In first examining the effect of affect on recognition, only hostility 
was correlated with the type of prejudice, while anxiety and positivity were not (hostility:  
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Figure 5. Affective responses to subtle and blatant racism. 
Note. Responses were provided on a 1-7 scale. 
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Figure 6. Intention to attempt to comprehend and confront a subtle or blatant racist 
individual. 
Note. Responses were provided on a 1-7 scale. 
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r = -.21, p = .038; anxiety: r = -.09, p = .384; positivity: r = .06, p = .600) and only 
hostility and positivity correlated with recognition of prejudice (hostility: r = .46, p <  
.001; anxiety: r = .17, p = .096; positivity: r = .38, p < .001). Therefore, only hostility 
qualified as a potential mediator. When it was entered with type of prejudice in a 
regression analysis, hostility predicted recognition of prejudice (β = .38, t = 4.40, p < 
.001). Consistent with partial mediation, the effect of the prejudice type manipulation on 
recognition of prejudice (r = -.44, p < .001) remained significant when it was entered in 
the regression equation with hostility (β = -.41, t = 4.77, p < .001), but was weaker than 
when it was considered as a lone predictor (β = -.44, t = 4.95, p < .001). A test for 
mediation utilizing bootstrap estimation of indirect effects (1000 replications) confirmed 
hostility as a partial mediator, two-tailed ps < .05 (95% CI for hostility indirect effect = -
.436, -.001). 
 However, hostility may be an outcome of recognition of prejudice, rather than 
leading to recognition. When recognition of prejudice was entered in a regression 
equation with the type of prejudice it predicted hostility (β = .47, t = 4.40, p < .001). 
Consistent with full mediation, the effect of the prejudice type manipulation on hostility 
(r = -.21, p = .038) did not remain significant when it was entered with recognition of 
prejudice, (β = .02, t = 0.28, p = .821). A test for mediation utilizing bootstrap estimation 
of indirect effects (1000 replications) confirmed recognition of prejudice as a full 
mediator, two-tailed ps < .05 (95% CI for recognition of prejudice indirect effect = -.968, 
-.268). 
 Role of society in recognition of prejudice. The role of perceived acceptability of 
prejudicial attitudes in mediating the effect of different types of racism on recognition of 
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prejudice was also examined. Participants’ perception of society’s acceptance of the type 
of prejudice correlated with the type of prejudice (r = .37, p < .001) as well as with the 
recognition of prejudice (r = -.61, p < .001) and therefore, qualified as a potential 
mediator. When the societal view was entered with type of prejudice in a regression 
analysis it predicted recognition of prejudice (β = -.50, t = 6.09, p < .001). Consistent 
with partial mediation, the effect of the prejudice type manipulation on recognition of 
prejudice remained significant when it was entered with societal acceptability, but was 
weaker than when it was considered as a lone predictor (β = -.29, t = 3.54, p = .001). A 
test for mediation utilizing bootstrap estimation of indirect effects (1000 replications) 
confirmed societal acceptability as a partial mediator, two-tailed ps < .05 (95% CI for 
societal acceptability indirect effect = -.761, -.204). 
 However, considering the inverted model, it may be that recognition of prejudice 
leads to a view that an attitude is unacceptable in society. When recognition of prejudice 
was entered in a regression equation with the type of prejudice it predicted beliefs about 
acceptability in society (β = -.56, t = 6.09, p < .001). Consistent with full mediation, the 
effect of the prejudice type manipulation on societal acceptability (r =.37, p < .001) did 
not remain significant when it was entered with recognition of prejudice (β = .11, t = 
1.20, p = .233). A test for mediation utilizing bootstrap estimation of indirect effects 
(1000 replications) confirmed recognition of prejudice as a full mediator, two-tailed ps < 
.05 (95% CI for societal acceptability indirect effect = .239, .699). 
 Consequences of prejudice recognition. The role of perceiving prejudice in 
mediating the effect of the different types of racism on response intentions was also 
examined. In first examining the effect of recognition of prejudice on responses toward 
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an individual expressing a racist belief, confrontation marginally correlated with the type 
of prejudice, while comprehension did not (confrontation: r = -.18, p = .081; 
comprehension: r = .12, p = .248) and therefore, only confrontation demonstrated a 
marginal relationship with the type of prejudice which may have been mediated. Further 
examination of correlations revealed that participants’ recognition of prejudice correlated 
with the type of prejudice (r = -.44, p < .001) and therefore, qualified as a potential 
mediator. When it was entered with type of prejudice in a regression analysis, it predicted 
intention to confront a racist individual (β = .55, t = 5.59, p < .001). Consistent with full 
mediation, the effect of the prejudice type manipulation on intentions to confront an 
individual did not remain significant when it was entered with recognition of prejudice (β 
= -.07, t = 0.79, p = .469). Individual tests for mediation utilizing bootstrap estimation of 
indirect effects (1000 replications) recognition of prejudice as a full mediator, two-tailed 
ps < .05 (95% CI for hostility indirect effect = -1.001, -.340). 
 Again, the inverse model of this mediation relationship was not tested due to it 
lacking conceptual meaning. 
Discussion 
 This study demonstrated that differential responses to subtle and blatant prejudice 
extend beyond sexism to other forms of prejudice, specifically racism. Overall, 
participants displayed a similar pattern of differential responses to subtle and blatant 
racism as they display to subtle and blatant sexism. Participants were less able to 
recognize subtle racism as prejudice compared to blatant racism. However, unlike 
sexism, responses indicated that it was still recognized as prejudice, though to a lesser 
extent than blatant racism. Although these results suggest that sexism may be recognized 
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as prejudice less than racism, it is impossible to determine this conclusively based on 
these two studies, as different items were used to measure racism and sexism making 
them not directly comparable. 
 Similar to sexism, overall participants reported less negative responses to subtle 
racism than to blatant racism. Subtle racism was seen as more acceptable in society than 
blatant racism and resulted in less negative and more positive affective responses. 
Further, participants reported less intention to confront a subtle racist individual than a 
blatant racist individual. However, unlike sexism, participants indicated greater intention 
to attempt to comprehend the views of a subtle racist individual than a blatant racist 
individual. 
 As in the previous study, the current study suggested that less confrontation of 
racism is a consequence of less recognition of subtle racism as prejudice. Given that as 
blatant prejudice has become less acceptable in society, subtle forms of prejudice have 
become more common (Dovidio, 2001), this suggests that racism will be confronted less 
in society because it is not recognized and therefore will be allowed to persist. 
 Unlike the previous study, this study found a potential role of societal 
acceptability in the recognition of prejudice, suggesting that individuals may detect 
prejudice based on their beliefs regarding an attitude’s acceptability in society. However, 
this relationship is not clear, as it may be that individuals use the recognition of prejudice 
to determine that an attitude is unacceptable. 
 Similar to the previous study, there was evidence that experiencing hostility in 
response to an attitude may play a role in recognizing prejudice. However, again there 
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was also support for recognition of prejudice leading to individuals experiencing 
hostility. 
Study 3 
 This study examines the beliefs individuals endorse regarding subtle and blatant 
prejudices.  These beliefs could provide insights into reasoning about subtle and blatant 
prejudice and thus differential responding to these forms of prejudice, which could be 
used to target interventions promoting recognition of subtle prejudice and taking action to 
confront this form of prejudice. 
Method 
 Participants. Participants were 63 introductory psychology students (21 male; 42 
female) at the University of Western Ontario. Participants ranged in age from 17 to 31 
years (M = 18.37, SD = 1.85). Most of the participants (60%, n = 34) self-identified as 
white; 30% (n = 17) self-identified as Asian, 5% (n = 3) as East Indian, 2% (n = 1) as 
Black, 3% (n = 2) as mixed ethnicity, and 8% (n = 5) as other. One participant did not 
indicate his or her ethnicity. All participants received partial course credit for 
participating. 
 Materials and Procedure. Participants were recruited to participate in a study on 
“Interpreting Social Beliefs.” Participants completed a computer-based questionnaire, in 
which they were presented with three sample items each from the Old-Fashioned and 
Modern Sexism scales (Swim et al., 1995), the Old-Fashioned and Modern racism scales 
(McConahay, 1986), as well as the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (Glick & Fiske, 1996), 
which includes both hostile sexism and benevolent sexism. As in Studies 1 and 2, 
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references to the “United States” were changed to “Canada” and any normally reverse 
scored items reworded to the sexist/racist attitude. 
 For each item presented, participants rated on a 7-point scale whether they 
thought the belief expressed in the statement was sexist/racist. For this scale, participants’ 
ratings for each of the three statements reflecting modern sexism were averaged to form 
an overall rating for modern sexism, and the same was done for old-fashioned sexism, 
modern racism, old-fashioned racism, benevolent sexism, and hostile sexism. Then the 
ratings for modern and benevolent sexism were averaged to obtain ratings for subtle 
sexism, and the ratings for old-fashioned and hostile sexism were averaged to obtain 
ratings for blatant sexism. The rating for modern racism alone formed the measure for 
subtle racism, while the rating for old-fashioned racism alone formed the rating for 
blatant racism. 
 Then, participants answered an open-ended question about why they did or did 
not define the statement as sexist/racist. Responses were coded into categories by two 
coders (inter-coder reliability = 92%; κ = .47) and discrepancies between the two coders 
were resolved by a third coder. Again, ratings were combined to form ratings for subtle 
and blatant sexism and racism. 
 Next, participants rated the extent to which they believed the underlying reason 
for endorsing the statement could reflect sexism/racism and how likely they believed the 
underlying reason for endorsing the statement would be sexism/racism, again using 7-
point scales. Again, ratings were combined to form ratings for subtle and blatant sexism 
and racism. 
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 Then, participants answered an open-ended question about what they believed 
could be the outcomes of endorsing the statement on the treatment of women/racial 
minorities. Responses were coded into categories by two coders (inter-coder reliability = 
90%; κ = .59) and discrepancies between the two coders were resolved by a third coder. 
Again, ratings were combined to form ratings for subtle and blatant sexism and racism. 
 For each item, participants also rated, on a 7-point scale, if they thought endorsing 
the statement could result in discrimination. Again, these rating were aggregated to form 
ratings of subtle and blatant sexism and racism. 
 Finally, participants answered a number of demographic items. 
Results 
 Recognition of Sexism and Racism. As seen in Figure 7, there was a significant 
main effect of type of prejudice on recognition of sexism
10
 or racism, F(1, 58) = 169.90, 
p < .001, with subtle prejudice recognized less than blatant prejudice,  t(58) = 13.03, p < 
.001. There was also a significant main effect of target of prejudice on recognition of 
sexism or racism, F(1, 58) = 117.40, p < .001, with sexism recognized less than racism, 
t(58) = 10.84, p < .001. 
 The interaction between type and target of prejudice was also significant, F(1, 58) 
= 5.48, p = .023. A slightly larger difference was observed between subtle and blatant 
sexism than between subtle and blatant racism, however, the difference between subtle  
and blatant prejudice was significant for both sexism, t(58) = 12.28, p < .001, and for 
racism, t(62) = 9.96, p < .001. 
                                                 
10
 Old fashioned sexism was perceived as more sexist than modern sexism, t(61) = 10.66, p < .001, and 
hostile sexism was perceived as more sexist than benevolent sexism, t(59) = 7.05, p < .001. 
  
54 
 
Figure 7. Recognition of subtle and blatant prejudice as sexist/racist. 
Note. Responses were provided on a 1-7 scale. 
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 Individuals identified a number of common reasons for identifying or not 
identifying specific beliefs as prejudice. As seen in Table 7, the most common reasons for 
perceiving a belief as prejudice were that the individual disagreed with the belief (i.e., it 
was wrong or factually incorrect), that it would have a negative impact on people’s 
attitudes toward women or racial minorities (i.e., increase prejudice or stereotyping), and 
that endorsement would have a negative impact on women or racial minorities (i.e., 
increase discrimination). Disagreement with statements included comments indicating 
belief that statements were factually inaccurate, such as “This statement is sexist because 
it gives a statement that one gender is better than the other in terms of intelligence 
without any scientific support”, as well as statements indicating that the statement was an 
opinion that they did not share, such as “i had a woman as a boss and she was very nice 
and i felt very comfortable”. Beliefs about a negative impact on attitudes toward 
minorities included comments such as, “It is making a generalization about a gender, 
making one gender seem inferior to another”, while beliefs about endorsement of the 
statement having a negative impact on women or racial minorities included responses 
such as “This statement is racist because the person saying it is not giving everyone an 
equal chance and they are against everyone getting together”. 
 Correspondingly, the most common reasons for not perceiving a belief as 
prejudice were that the individual agreed with the belief, that it would not have a negative 
impact or would have a positive impact on people’s attitudes toward women or racial 
minorities, and that endorsement would not have a negative impact or would have a 
positive impact on women or racial minorities. Individuals also occasionally discussed 
prejudice directed toward groups other than women or racial minorities (e.g., men, gay  
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Table 7 
Frequency (Percentage) of Reasons Why Type of Sexism/Racism is or is not Prejudice 
 
Old-
Fashioned 
Sexism 
Modern 
Sexism 
Old-
Fashioned 
Racism 
Modern 
Racism 
Hostile 
Sexism 
Benevolent 
Sexism 
Is prejudice       
    Disagree 67 (35.4) 40 (21.2) 48 (25.4) 55 (29.1) 44 (23.3) 19 (10.1) 
    Attitudes 89 (47.1) 18 (9.5) 77 (40.7) 60 (31.7) 76 (40.2) 61 (32.3) 
    Minority 4 (2.1) 9 (4.8) 23 (12.2) 12 (6.3) 11 (5.8) 0 (0.0) 
    Other 16 (8.5) 6 (3.2) 42 (22.2) 10 (5.3) 6 (3.2) 6 (3.2) 
    Other Target 12 (12) 1 (0.5) 0 (0.0) 2 (1.1) 11 (5.8) 26 (13.8) 
Is not prejudice       
    Agree 16 (8.5) 36 (19.0) 4 (2.1) 25 (13.2) 22 (11.6) 51 (27.0) 
    Attitudes 6 (3.2) 30 (15.9) 0 (0.0) 9 (4.8) 8 (4.2) 24 (12.7) 
    Minority 1 (0.5) 9 (4.8) 0 (0.0) 3 (1.6) 1 (0.5) 8 (4.2) 
    Other 11 (5.8) 20 (10.6) 5 (2.6) 15 (7.9) 9 (4.8) 11 (5.8) 
    No Target 0 (0.0) 3 (1.6) 2 (1.1) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 3 (1.6) 
Non-relevant       
    True 2 (1.1) 2 (1.1) 0 (0.0) 2 (1.1) 2 (1.1) 2 (1.1) 
    False 1 (0.5) 4 (2.1) 0 (0.0) 6 (3.2) 0 (0.0) 3 (1.6) 
    Other 4 (2.1) 4 (11) 1 (0.5) 5 (2.6) 6 (3.2) 0 (0.0) 
 
Note: Reasons provided for why statement is prejudice included: disagreement with the 
statement, belief that endorsement would result in negative attitudes, belief that 
endorsement would have a negative impact on women/racial minorities, other reasons, 
and belief that statement represented prejudice against a group other than women/racial 
minorities. Reasons provided for why statement is not prejudice included: agreement with 
statement, belief that endorsement would not result in negative attitudes, belief that 
endorsement would not have a negative impact on women/racial minorities, other 
reasons, and belief that statement represents prejudice against no group. Reasons that 
were stated to be irrelevant to the judgement of prejudice included truth of statement, 
falseness of statement, or other reasons. 
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men) or toward no specific groups, as well as other reasons (i.e., inherently racist/sexist)  
for the statements being prejudice. Agreement with statements included comments 
indicating belief that statements were factually accurate, such as “This statement is very 
much true. My parents have been married for 26 years and it is obvious that my dad 
adores my mom. Proof is the fact their marriage is still strong”, as well as statements 
indicating that the statement was an opinion that they also shared, such as “my parents 
are strong believers in this statement. I am not allowed to "bring home" someone of 
another nationality such as black or indian. Its not the fact that we have different rights 
they are just as deserving as we are however we shouldnt mix.” Beliefs about a positive 
or neutral impact on attitudes toward minorities included comments such as, “This 
statement isn't sexist because it is just stating that women who used to be discriminated 
against in Canada are no longer in that same position.  It is not putting the female sex 
down nor is it making fun of it.  It is just stating that discrimination against women is no 
longer a problem”, while beliefs about a positive or neutral impact on minority groups 
included comments such as, “It is a positive statement promoting the unity of a man and a 
woman”. 
 Additionally, agreement or disagreement with the statement as well as other 
reasons were also occasionally described by participants as being irrelevant to the 
judgement of whether or not the belief expressed in the statement was prejudice. 
 There were different numbers of reasons identified for why blatant or subtle forms 
of prejudice were or were not prejudice
11, χ2(60) = 410.09, p < .001. Specifically, more 
reasons were identified for beliefs being prejudice, and fewer reasons were identified for 
                                                 
11
 Correlations were run to attempt to determine which, if any, reasons were associated with identifying 
prejudice. However, no strong relationships were identified (all rs < .15). 
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beliefs not being prejudice for old fashioned sexism compared to modern sexism, χ2(1) = 
67.62, p < .001, old fashioned racism compared to modern racism, χ2(1) = 38.67, p < 
.001, and hostile sexism compared to benevolent sexism, χ2(1) = 33.40, p < .001, as well 
as for old fashioned racism compared to old fashioned sexism, χ2(1) = 14.79, p < .001, 
and modern racism compared to modern sexism, χ2(1) = 30.96, p < .001. 
 Additionally, there were differences in the frequency of each type of reason, 
excluding reasons for the statements targeting groups other than women or racial 
minorities, that were identified for why the different forms of prejudice were in fact 
sexist or racist, χ2(15) = 94.57, p < .001. Different reasons were identified more 
frequently for old fashioned sexism compared to modern sexism, χ2(3) = 21.46, p < .001, 
old fashioned racism compared to modern racism, χ2(3) = 17.61, p = .001, and hostile 
sexism compared to benevolent sexism, χ2(3) = 11.50, p = .009, as well as for old 
fashioned racism compared to old fashioned sexism, χ2(3) = 28.54, p < .001. There were 
no differences for modern racism compared to modern sexism, χ2(3) = 7.62, p = .055. 
 While there was some indication that there were differences in the frequency of 
reasons, excluding reasons for the statements targeting groups other than women or racial 
minorities, that were identified for why the different forms of prejudice were not sexist or 
racist, χ2(15) = 25.56, p = .043, these differences did not appear to be a result of 
differences between subtle and blatant forms of prejudice or between sexism and racism. 
There were no differences in the frequency of reasons for old fashioned sexism compared 
to modern sexism, χ2(3) = 4.97, p = .174, old fashioned racism compared to modern 
racism, χ2(3) = 3.77, p = .288, and hostile sexism compared to benevolent sexism, χ2(3) = 
4.06, p = .255, as well as for old fashioned racism compared to old fashioned sexism, 
  
59 
χ2(3) = 2.89, p = .408, and modern racism compared to modern sexism, χ2(3) = 4.84, p = 
.184. 
 Recognition of Role of Sexism and Racism in Endorsement of Attitude. As 
seen in Figure 8, there was a significant main effect of type of prejudice on recognition 
that sexism
12
 or racism could be the underlying reason for endorsing the statement, F(1, 
59) = 141.46, p < .001, with sexism or racism seen as a possible underlying reason for 
subtle prejudice less than for blatant prejudice,  t(59) = 11.89, p < .001. There was also a 
significant main effect of target of prejudice on recognition that sexism or racism could 
be the underlying reason for endorsing the statement, F(1, 59) = 137.02, p < .001, with 
sexism recognized as a possible underlying reason less than racism,  t(59) = 11.71, p < 
.001. 
 The interaction between type and target of prejudice was also significant, F(1, 59) 
= 5.82, p = .019. A slightly larger difference was observed between subtle and blatant 
sexism than between subtle and blatant racism, however, the difference between subtle 
and blatant prejudice was significant for both sexism, t(59) = 11.56, p < .001, and for 
racism, t(62) = 8.00, p < .001. 
 As seen in Figure 9, there was a significant main effect of type of prejudice on 
believing that sexism
13
 or racism was likely to be the underlying reason for endorsing the 
statement, F(1, 59) = 162.51, p < .001, with sexism or racism seen as the likely 
underlying reason for subtle prejudice less than for blatant prejudice,  t(59) = 12.75, p <  
                                                 
12
 Old fashioned sexism was recognized as possibly being based on underlying sexism more than was 
modern sexism, t(60) = 7.79, p < .001, and hostile sexism was recognized as possibly being based on 
underlying sexism more than was benevolent sexism, t(61) = 9.16, p < .001. 
13
 Old fashioned sexism was perceived as likely being based on underlying sexism more than was modern 
sexism, t(60) = 8.44, p < .001, and hostile sexism was perceived as likely being based on underlying sexism 
more than was benevolent sexism, t(61) = 9.04, p < .001. 
  
60 
 
Figure 8. Belief that sexism/racism could be the underlying reason for endorsing subtle 
or blatant prejudiced beliefs. 
Note. Responses were provided on a 1-7 scale. 
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Figure 9. Belief that sexism/racism is the likely underlying reason for endorsing subtle or 
blatant prejudiced beliefs. 
Note. Responses were provided on a 1-7 scale. 
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.001. There was also a significant main effect of target of prejudice on the belief that 
sexism or racism was likely to be the underlying reason for endorsing the statement, F(1, 
59) = 145.24, p < .001, with sexism recognized as the likely underlying reason less than 
racism,  t(59) = 12.05, p < .001. 
 The interaction between type and target of prejudice was also significant, F(1, 59) 
= 5.89, p = .018. A slightly larger difference was observed between subtle and blatant 
sexism than between subtle and blatant racism, however, the difference between subtle 
and blatant prejudice was significant for both sexism, t(59) = 11.58, p < .001, and for 
racism, t(62) = 9.19, p < .001. 
 Perceived Outcomes of Sexism and Racism. Individuals identified a number of 
common outcomes for women or racial minorities that would result from endorsing 
beliefs represented by each statement. As seen in Table 8, most commonly, outcomes 
could be categorized as having a negative impact on women or racial minorities (i.e., lead 
to discrimination or prejudice) or on society more generally (reduce value for equality) or 
categorized as having a positive impact on women or racial minorities or society. Beliefs 
about endorsement having a negative impact on minorities included comments describing 
outcomes such as, “Men feeling superior and treating women poorly”, while beliefs about 
a positive impact on minorities included comments such as, “The outcomes of endorsing 
this statement on women means that the reader accepts this statement as the truth which 
will then result to not discriminating against women and having both sexes be treated 
equally.” Beliefs about endorsement of the statement having a negative impact on society 
included responses such as “It will separate Canadians into distinct cultural and ethnic 
groups that do not share the same sense of identity”, while beliefs about a positive impact  
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Table 8 
Frequency (Percentage) of Expected Outcomes of Endorsing Types of Sexism/Racism 
 
Old-
Fashioned 
Sexism 
Modern 
Sexism 
Old-
Fashioned 
Racism 
Modern 
Racism 
Hostile 
Sexism 
Benevolent 
Sexism 
Negative: 
Minority 
107 (56.6) 62 (32.8) 143 (75.7) 94 (49.7) 124 (65.6) 52 (27.5) 
Negative: 
Society 
26 (13.8) 48 (25.4) 25 (13.2) 28 (14.8) 24 (12.7) 6 (3.2) 
Negative: 
Endorser 
14 (7.4) 4 (2.1) 11 (5.8) 7 (3.7) 11 (5.8) 2 (1.1) 
Positive: 
Minority 
9 (4.8) 16 (8.5) 1 (0.5) 8 (4.2) 4 (2.1) 53 (28.0) 
Positive: 
Society 
1 (0.5) 20 (10.6) (0.0) 14 (7.4) 3 (1.6) 3 (1.6) 
Positive: 
Endorser 
0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (0.5) 1 (0.5) 4 (2.1) 8 (4.2) 
Neutral 23 (12.2) 30 (15.9) 14 (7.4) 19 (10.1) 17 (9.0) 44 (23.3) 
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on society included comments such as, “It would only benefit society as then men and 
women would be viewed as equal.”. 
 Individuals also occasionally discussed negative or positive outcomes for the 
individual who endorsed the belief expressed in the statement. Additionally, some beliefs 
were frequently described as having no impact or neutral outcomes for women or racial 
minorities. 
 Further, there were different outcomes identified for blatant and subtle forms of 
sexism
14
 and racism, χ2(30) = 333.58, p < .001. Specifically, excluding outcomes for the 
endorser, more negative outcomes, and fewer positive or neutral outcomes were reported 
for old fashioned sexism compared to modern sexism, χ2(1) = 12.90, p < .001, old 
fashioned racism compared to modern racism, χ2(1) = 18.27, p < .001, and hostile sexism 
compared to benevolent sexism, χ2(1) = 85.46, p < .001, as well as for old fashioned 
racism compared to old fashioned sexism, χ2(1) = 10.02, p = .002, and modern racism 
compared to modern sexism, χ2(1) = 5.98, p = .015. 
 Additionally there were differences in the negative outcomes, excluding outcomes 
for the endorser, that were identified for the different forms of prejudice, χ2(5) = 43.83, p 
< .001. Negative outcomes for the minority group rather than society were identified 
more commonly for old fashioned sexism compared to modern sexism, χ2(1) = 16.49, p < 
.001, but not for old fashioned racism compared to modern racism, χ2(1) = 3.08, p = .079, 
and hostile sexism compared to benevolent sexism, χ2(1) = 1.15, p = .283, as well as for 
old fashioned racism compared to old fashioned sexism, χ2(1) = 1.15, p = .284. Negative 
                                                 
14
 Old fashioned sexism was perceived as more likely to result in discrimination than was modern sexism, 
t(61) = 8.23, p < .001, and hostile sexism was perceived as more likely to result in discrimination than was 
benevolent sexism, t(61) = 7.78, p < .001. 
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outcomes for the minority group rather than society were also identified more commonly 
for modern racism compared to modern sexism, χ2(1) = 11.24, p = .001. 
 There were differences in positive and neutral outcomes, excluding outcomes for 
the endorser, that were identified for the different forms of prejudice, χ2(10) = 68.13, p < 
.001. These differences appeared to be a result of differences between subtle and blatant 
forms of prejudice, rather than between sexism and racism. There were greater neutral, 
rather than positive outcomes identified for old fashioned sexism compared to modern 
sexism, χ2(2) = 10.21, p = .006, old fashioned racism compared to modern racism, χ2(2) = 
10.37, p = .006, and hostile sexism compared to benevolent sexism, χ2(2) = 12.00, p = 
.002, but not for old fashioned racism compared to old fashioned sexism, χ2(2) = 3.30, p 
= .192, and modern racism compared to modern sexism, χ2(2) = 0.37, p = .829. 
 As seen in Figure 10, there was a significant main effect of type of prejudice on 
the belief that discrimination could result from endorsing the statement, F(1, 60) = 
117.21, p < .001, with subtle prejudice seen as resulting in discrimination less than 
blatant prejudice,  t(60) = 10.83, p < .001. There was also a significant main effect of 
target of prejudice on the belief that discrimination could result from endorsing the 
statement, F(1, 60) = 113.97, p < .001, with sexism seen as leading to discrimination less 
than racism, t(60) = 10.68, p < .001. The interaction between type and target of prejudice 
was not significant, F(1, 60) = 3.05, p = .086. 
Discussion 
 This study replicated the effects previously observed that individuals are less 
likely to recognize subtle prejudice compared to blatant prejudice and less likely to 
recognize sexism compared to racism. Additionally, an interaction between the type of  
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Figure 10. Belief that discrimination could result from subtle or blatant prejudiced 
beliefs. 
Note. Responses were provided on a 1-7 scale. 
 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Blatant Subtle
Racism
Sexism
  
67 
prejudice and the target of prejudice was observed. There was a greater difference 
between subtle and blatant sexism than between subtle and blatant racism. 
 This study provided insight into the consistently observed pattern of responding to 
different forms of prejudice. Individuals demonstrated that they believed subtle 
expressions of prejudice represented underlying prejudice to a lesser extent than did 
blatant expressions, and similarly that sexist expressions represented underlying prejudice 
to a lesser extent than did racist expressions. Further, this same pattern emerged for the 
expectancy that endorsing different forms of prejudice would result in discrimination. 
Subtle prejudice and sexism were perceived to be less likely to result in discrimination 
than were blatant prejudice and racism. Further, this pattern was also observed for the 
descriptions of outcomes of endorsing different forms of prejudice. More negative 
outcomes were described for blatant prejudice and racism than for subtle prejudice and 
sexism, while more positive or neutral outcomes were expected for subtle prejudice and 
sexism than for blatant prejudice and racism. There were also differences in the specific 
types of negative, positive and neutral outcomes anticipated to result from each form of 
prejudice. Modern sexism emerged as having different anticipated negative outcomes 
compared to both old fashioned sexism, as well as compared to modern racism. Modern 
sexism was viewed as having less of a negative impact on women specifically, but rather 
more of a negative impact on society generally and the valuing of equality. A difference 
also emerged for expected positive and neutral outcomes from subtle versus blatant 
prejudice. Neutral, rather than positive, outcomes were anticipated more for blatant 
prejudice rather than subtle prejudice, for which positive outcomes were anticipated. 
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 Additionally, this study suggested some criteria individuals may rely on in order 
to decide whether or not expressions of different forms of prejudice are in fact 
prejudiced. Specifically, whether or not individuals agree with expressions of prejudice, 
and the beliefs they hold regarding impact of these expressions on other people’s 
attitudes toward and treatment of minority groups appear to be very important factors. As 
well, there were differences in these beliefs for subtle and blatant sexism and racism, 
corresponding to the previously observed differences in responses to subtle versus blatant 
prejudice and to sexism versus racism. Individuals recognized blatant prejudice and 
racism more than subtle prejudice and sexism because they disagreed with them more 
and recognized more negative outcomes from them than from subtle prejudice and 
sexism. On the other hand, they failed to recognize subtle prejudice and sexism more than 
blatant prejudice and racism, because they agreed with them more and recognized less 
negative outcomes and more positive outcomes from them than from blatant prejudice 
and racism. While there were differences among the specific reasons for recognizing 
prejudices, no clear pattern emerged for subtle versus blatant prejudice or for sexism 
versus racism, and there were no differences among the reasons cited for not recognizing 
prejudice. 
Study 4 
 This study explored the potential negative consequences of the more positive 
responses to subtle prejudice compared to blatant prejudice that were observed in the 
previous studies. A non-prejudice control was added to explore if subtle prejudice is not 
treated as prejudice or rather is treated as prejudice to a lesser extent than blatant 
prejudice. Further, in this study, sexism and racism were directly compared to allow for 
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examination of differential responses to these forms of prejudice. A condition combining 
sexism and racism was also included to explore if there is a potentially additive effect on 
responses. 
Method 
 Participants. Participants were 169 introductory psychology students at the 
University of Western Ontario. Due to improper responding (i.e., completing the study 
too quickly or otherwise demonstrating materials and questions had not been read), 28 
participants were excluded from all data analysis, leaving 141 participants (93 female and 
47 male) included in the analysis. Participants ranged in age from 17 to 47 years (M = 
18.71, SD = 2.96). Most of the participants (65%, n = 91) self-identified as white; 20% (n 
= 28) self-identified as Asian, 6% (n = 9) as East Indian, 2% (n = 3) as black, 1% (n = 2) 
as North American Indian, 1% (n = 1) as Hispanic, and 4% (n = 6) as other. One 
participant did not identify his or her ethnicity. All participants received partial course 
credit for participating. 
 Materials and Procedure. Participants were recruited to participate in an online 
study on “Understanding Employment Decisions”. Participants first viewed a one-page 
job description for a project manager. They then viewed a resume of an applicant for the 
job as well as a picture of the applicant. They were then informed that the applicant 
received an interview for the job and they viewed the interviewer’s decision, which was 
to not hire the applicant. Finally, they viewed the picture and resume of an individual 
they were informed was the successful job applicant. The successful applicant was a 
white male. The resumes of the unsuccessful and successful applicants were 
counterbalanced. This study had a 3x3 prejudice target by prejudice type between 
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subjects design. Prejudice target was manipulated with the picture of the unsuccessful 
applicant. The unsuccessful applicant was either a black male (racism condition), white 
female (sexism condition), or black female (racism and sexism condition). The prejudice 
type was manipulated in the explanation of the interviewer’s decision. The reason for the 
applicant not being hired for the job was either based on subtle prejudice, blatant 
prejudice, or in the control condition was non-prejudicial (see Appendix D). 
 After participants viewed these materials, they completed a computer-based 
questionnaire examining their responses to the hiring decision. Participants rated each 
item using a 7-point scale. First participants rated their perception of the hiring decision, 
including whether the unsuccessful candidate should accept or protest the hiring decision, 
whether the company should accept or change the hiring decision, if they would support 
the unsuccessful candidate protesting the decision, if they think the unsuccessful 
candidate would be successful if they protested the hiring decision, and if they think the 
hiring decision was based on discrimination. Participants then completed the affect items 
used in the previous studies to rate how they feel about the hiring decision and how they 
would feel if the unsuccessful candidate protested the hiring decision. Next, participants 
rated their intended responses toward the interviewer, again using the same items used in 
the previous studies.  
 Following these items assessing participants’ responses to the hiring decision, 
participants were presented with a scenario in which a job opportunity that they were 
qualified for was available at the same company from which they had just viewed the 
hiring decision. Their responses to this job opportunity were then assessed on a number 
of measures (intention to apply for the job, willingness to work for the company, 
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expectation of obtaining the job if interviewed by the same interviewer, expectation of 
obtaining the job if interviewed by a different interviewer, intention to protest not 
receiving the job if they were interviewed by the same interviewer, intention to protest 
not receiving the job if they were interviewed by a different interviewer). Finally, 
participants responded to the previously used affect items in response to receiving or not 
receiving the job after being interviewed by the same or a different interviewer. 
Participants also rated how much they would feel they had earned the job on their own 
merits when they obtained the job after being interviewed by the same or a different 
interviewer, as well as how much they would feel treated fairly if they did not obtain the 
job after being interviewed by the same or a different interviewer.  
 Participants also completed a number of demographic items. 
Results 
 Measure Reliabilities. Based on factor analysis (PCA, Varimax Rotation; see 
Table 9) and reliability analysis the items assessing participants’ perception of the hiring 
decision were combined together to form one measure of their perception of the hiring 
decision as discriminatory (α = .89). Given the similar response pattern for anxiety and 
hostility in the previous studies, as well as based on factor analysis (PCA, Varimax 
Rotation; see Tables 10-11) and reliability analysis, hostility and anxiety were combined 
into a measure of negative affect for both the hiring decision (α = .88) and protesting the 
decision (α = .82), while the measure of positive affect consisted of the same items as in 
the previous studies, again for both the hiring decision (α = .87) and protesting the 
decision (α = .70). Based on factor analysis (PCA, Varimax Rotation; see Table 12) and 
reliability analysis disliking the interviewer, being unwilling to collaborate, and intending  
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Table 9 
Component Matrix for Perception of Hiring Decision Measures 
 1 
Should candidate accept or 
protest? 
.881 
Should decision be 
accepted or changed? 
.870 
Support for protest .886 
Success of protest .659 
Discrimination .858 
 
Note. Bold indicates factor in which items were included for data analysis. 
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Table 10 
Rotated Component Matrix for Affect in Response to Employment Decision Measures 
 1 2 
Angry .782 -.406 
Indignant .688 .007 
Disappointed .804 -.351 
Weak .685 .090 
Tense .823 -.052 
Sad .818 -.268 
Happy -.132 .875 
Secure -.025 .838 
Content -.164 .914 
 
Note. Bold indicates factor in which items were included for data analysis. 
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Table 11 
Rotated Component Matrix for Affect in Response to Protest Decision Measures 
 1 2 
Angry .776 -.301 
Indignant .648 .306 
Disappointed .738 -.185 
Weak .765 .081 
Tense .606 .188 
Sad .832 -.092 
Happy -.228 .828 
Secure .291 .632 
Content -.047 .861 
 
Note. Bold indicates factor in which items were included for data analysis. 
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Table 12 
Rotated Component Matrix for Response to Interviewer Measures 
 1 2 
Speak .409 .760 
Understand -.166 .858 
Change Opinion .708 .541 
Dislike .860 .161 
Unwilling to 
Collaborate 
.863 -.126 
 
Note. Bold indicates factor in which items were included for data analysis. 
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to attempt to change the opinion of the interviewer formed one measure of confrontation 
(α = .79), while the items for intending to speak to the interviewer and to attempt to 
understand why the interviewer would hold his or her attitude were analyzed separately, 
based on reliability analysis. 
 For the items assessing participants’ responses to the hypothetical job 
opportunity, measures were formed based on factor analysis (PCA, Varimax Rotation; 
see Table 13) and reliability analysis. The intention to apply for the job and willingness to 
work for the company were combined into one measure of job intentions (α = .92), the 
intention to protest not receiving the job when interviewed by the same or a different 
interviewer were combined into one measure of protest intentions (α = .76), while 
expectations of obtaining the job if interviewed by the same or a different interviewer 
were each analyzed separately. The affect items were combined, based on factor analysis 
(PCA, Varimax Rotation; see Tables 14-17) and reliabilities, to form measures of 
negative affect (α = .88) and positive affect (α = .84) when receiving the job from the 
same interviewer, negative affect (α = .87) and positive affect (α = .82) when receiving 
the job from a different interviewer, negative affect (α = .85) and positive affect (α = .79) 
when not receiving the job from the same interviewer, and negative affect (α = .82) and 
positive affect (α = .78) when not receiving the job from a different interviewer. Items for 
whether participants believed that they earned the job on their own merits when they 
were interviewed by the same or a different interviewer and were treated fairly when they 
did not receive the job from the same interviewer or a different interviewer were analyzed 
separately. 
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Table 13 
Rotated Component Matrix for Response to Employment Opportunity Measures 
 1 2 
 Apply .857 .190 
Work for company .876 .086 
Receive job from 
same interviewer 
.687 -.312 
Receive job from 
different interviewer 
.529 .093 
Protest same 
interviewer 
-.034 .923 
Protest different 
interviewer 
.160 .835 
 
Note. Bold indicates factor in which items were included for data analysis. Items 
‘Receive job from same interviewer’ and ‘Receive job from different interviewer’ were 
analyzed separately based on reliability. 
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Table 14 
Rotated Component Matrix for Affect in Response to Receiving Job from Same 
Interviewer Measures 
 1 2 
Angry .814 -.331 
Indignant .667 .223 
Disappointed .865 -.314 
Weak .748 -.322 
Tense .680 -.343 
Sad .841 -.294 
Happy -.378 .781 
Secure -.098 .870 
Content -.182 .816 
 
Note. Bold indicates factor in which items were included for data analysis. 
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Table 15 
Rotated Component Matrix for Affect in Response to Receiving Job from Different 
Interviewer Measures 
 1 2 
Angry .849 -.342 
Indignant .551 .244 
Disappointed .886 -.271 
Weak .767 -.286 
Tense .811 -.309 
Sad .863 -.263 
Happy -.342 .758 
Secure -.131 .849 
Content -.142 .861 
 
Note. Bold indicates factor in which items were included for data analysis. 
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Table 16 
Rotated Component Matrix for Affect in Response to not Receiving Job from Same 
Interviewer Measures 
 1 2 
Angry .827 -.164 
Indignant .761 .111 
Disappointed .738 -.235 
Weak .641 .062 
Tense .784 .042 
Sad .791 -.190 
Happy -.043 .904 
Secure .059 .857 
Content -.150 .752 
 
Note. Bold indicates factor in which items were included for data analysis. 
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Table 17 
Rotated Component Matrix for Affect in Response to not Receiving Job from Different 
Interviewer Measures 
 1 2 
Angry .801 -.009 
Indignant .640 .375 
Disappointed .726 -.419 
Weak .616 .219 
Tense .778 .158 
Sad .777 -.254 
Happy .030 .865 
Secure .089 .819 
Content -.017 .782 
 
Note. Bold indicates factor in which items were included for data analysis. 
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 Perception of Hiring Decision. As seen in Figure 11, there was no significant 
interaction between the type of prejudice and target of prejudice on the perception of the 
hiring decision as discriminatory, F(4, 132) = 1.407, p = .235. 
 The main effect of type of prejudice on the perception of the hiring decision was 
significant, F(2, 132) = 36.471, p < .001. The no prejudice condition was seen as 
significantly less discriminatory than the blatant prejudice condition, t(91) = 8.291, p < 
.001, as well as the subtle prejudice condition, t(90) = 4.105, p < .001. Additionally, the 
subtle prejudice condition was seen as less discriminatory than the blatant prejudice 
condition, t(95) = 4.833, p < .001. 
 There was a significant main effect of target of prejudice on the perception of the 
hiring decision as discriminatory, F(2, 132) = 3.685, p = .028. The decision to not hire a 
woman was seen as significantly less discriminatory than not hiring a racial minority, 
t(93) = 2.462, p = .016, or a racial minority woman, t(102) = 2.791, p = .006. However, 
there was no significant difference between a racial minority and a racial minority 
woman, t(81) = 0.004, p = .997. 
 Affective Responses. 
 Negative affective response to hiring decision. As seen in Figure 12, there was 
no significant interaction between type of prejudice and target of prejudice on the 
negative affect experienced as a result of the hiring decision, F(4, 125) = 0.415, p = .798. 
 The main effect of type of prejudice on negative affect was significant, F(2, 125) 
= 7.830, p = .001. Blatant prejudice resulted in significantly more negative affect than no 
prejudice, t(86) = 4.197, p < .001, as well as than subtle prejudice, t(90) = 3.534, p =  
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Figure 11. Perception of discrimination in hiring decision based on no prejudice, subtle 
prejudice, or blatant prejudice toward a woman, racial minority, or racial minority 
woman. 
Note. Responses were provided on a 1-7 scale. 
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Figure 12. Negative affect in response to hiring decision expressing no prejudice, subtle 
prejudice, or blatant prejudice toward a woman, racial minority, or racial minority 
woman. 
Note. Responses were provided on a 1-7 scale. 
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.001. However, there was no significant difference between subtle prejudice and no 
prejudice, t(86) = 0.676, p = .501. 
 There was a significant main effect of target of prejudice on negative affect, F(2, 
125) = 3.927, p = .022. A female target resulted in significantly less negative affect than a 
racial minority target, t(86) = 2.586, p = .011, and a racial minority female target, t(96) = 
3.056, p = .003. However, there was no significant difference between the racial minority 
target and racial minority female target, t(80) = 0.138, p = .890. 
 Positive affective response to hiring decision. As seen in Figure 13, there was no 
significant interaction between type of prejudice and target of prejudice on the positive 
affect experienced as a result of the hiring decision, F(4, 130) = 0.602, p = .662. There 
was also no significant main effect of target of prejudice on positive affect, F(2, 130) = 
0.541, p = .583. 
 The main effect of type of prejudice on positive affect was significant, F(2, 130) = 
8.743, p < .001. Blatant prejudice resulted in significantly less positive affect than no 
prejudice, t(91) = 4.632, p < .001, as well as significantly less than subtle prejudice, t(93) 
= 2.995, p = .004. However, there was no significant difference between subtle prejudice 
and no prejudice, t(88) = 1.956, p = .054. 
 Negative affective response to protesting hiring decision. As seen in Figure 14, 
there was no significant interaction between type of prejudice and target of prejudice on 
the negative affect experienced in response to protesting the hiring decision, F(4, 129) =  
0.781, p = .539. There was also no significant main effect of type of prejudice on 
negative affect, F(2, 129) = 2.085, p = .129, and no significant main effect of target of 
prejudice on negative affect, F(2, 129) = 1.854, p = .161. 
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Figure 13. Positive affect in response to hiring decision expressing no prejudice, subtle 
prejudice, or blatant prejudice toward a woman, racial minority, or racial minority 
woman. 
Note. Responses were provided on a 1-7 scale. 
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Figure 14. Negative affect experienced in response to protesting hiring decision 
expressing no prejudice, subtle prejudice, or blatant prejudice toward a woman, racial 
minority, or racial minority woman. 
Note. Responses were provided on a 1-7 scale. 
 
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
Woman Racial Minority Racial Minority Woman
No Prejudice
Subtle
Blatant
  
88 
 Positive affective response to protesting hiring decision. As seen in Figure 15, 
there was no significant interaction between type of prejudice and target of prejudice on 
the positive affect experienced in response to protesting the hiring decision, F(4, 129) =  
1.743, p = .145. There was also no significant main effect of target of prejudice on 
positive affect, F(2, 129) = 1.341, p = .265. 
 The main effect of type of prejudice on positive affect was significant, F(2, 129) = 
5.662, p = .004. Protesting blatant prejudice resulted in significantly more positive affect 
than protesting no prejudice, t(89) = 3.553, p = .001, as well as than protesting subtle 
prejudice, t(93) = 2.984, p = .004. However, there was no significant difference between 
protesting subtle prejudice and no prejudice, t(88) = 0.890, p = .376. 
 Responses to Prejudiced Interviewer. 
 Understand view of interviewer. As seen in Figure 16, there was no significant 
interaction between type of prejudice and target of prejudice on intentions to attempt to 
understand the interviewer’s view, F(4, 132) = 0.550, p = .699. There was also no 
significant main effect of type of prejudice, F(2, 132) = 0.202, p = .817, and no 
significant main effect of target of prejudice, F(2, 132) = 0.702, p = .498. 
 Speak to interviewer. As seen in Figure 17, there was no significant interaction 
between type of prejudice and target of prejudice on intentions to speak to the interviewer 
about their decision, F(4, 131) = 1.195, p = .316. There was also no significant main 
effect of target of prejudice on intentions to speak to the interviewer, F(2, 131) = 1.723, p 
= .183. 
 The main effect of type of prejudice on intentions to speak to the interviewer 
about their decision was significant, F(2, 131) = 8.687, p < .001. Blatant prejudice  
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Figure 15. Positive affect experienced in response to protesting hiring decision 
expressing no prejudice, subtle prejudice, or blatant prejudice toward a woman, racial 
minority, or racial minority woman. 
Note. Responses were provided on a 1-7 scale. 
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Figure 16. Intention to attempt to understand why interviewer holds view expressed as no 
prejudice, subtle prejudice, or blatant prejudice toward a woman, racial minority, or racial 
minority woman. 
Note. Responses were provided on a 1-7 scale. 
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Figure 17. Intention to speak to interviewer who holds an attitude of no prejudice, subtle 
prejudice, or blatant prejudice toward a woman, racial minority, or racial minority 
woman. 
Note. Responses were provided on a 1-7 scale. 
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resulted in significantly more intention to speak to the interviewer than no prejudice, 
t(90) = 4.842, p < .001, as well as than subtle prejudice, t(95) = 2.809, p = .006. 
However, there was no significant difference between subtle prejudice and no prejudice 
in the intention to speak to the interviewer, t(89) = 1.694, p = .094. 
 Confront interviewer. As seen in Figure 18, there was no significant interaction 
between type of prejudice and target of prejudice on intentions to confront the 
interviewer, F(4, 132) = 0.564, p = .689. 
 The main effect of type of prejudice on intentions to confront the interviewer was 
significant, F(2, 132) = 19.068, p < .001. Blatant prejudice resulted in significantly more 
intention to confront the interviewer than no prejudice, t(91) = 6.849, p < .001, as well as 
than subtle prejudice, t(95) = 4.745, p < .001. However, there was no significant 
difference between subtle prejudice and no prejudice, t(90) = 1.923, p = .058. 
 There was a significant main effect of target of prejudice on intentions to confront 
the interviewer, F(2, 132) = 4.498, p = .013. A female target resulted in significantly less 
intention to confront the interviewer than a racial minority target, t(93) = 2.588, p = .011, 
and a racial minority female target, t(102) = 3.026, p = .003. However, there was no 
significant difference between a racial minority target and a racial minority female target, 
t(81) = 0.318, p = .752. 
 Job Opportunity Responses. 
 Job opportunity intentions. As seen in Figure 19, there was no significant 
interaction between type of prejudice and target of prejudice on intentions toward the 
potential job opportunity, F(4, 116) = 0.253, p = .908. There was also no significant main  
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Figure 18. Intention to confront interviewer who holds an attitude of no prejudice, subtle 
prejudice, or blatant prejudice toward a woman, racial minority, or racial minority 
woman. 
Note. Responses were provided on a 1-7 scale. 
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Figure 19. Intentions to seek job opportunity at company employing interviewer who 
holds attitudes expressing no prejudice, subtle prejudice, or blatant prejudice toward a 
woman, racial minority, or racial minority woman. 
Note. Responses were provided on a 1-7 scale. 
 
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
Woman Racial Minority Racial Minority Woman
No Prejudice
Subtle
Blatant
  
95 
effect of type of prejudice, F(2, 116) = 2.289, p = .106, and no significant main effect of 
target of prejudice, F(2, 116) = 0.199, p = .819. 
 Job opportunity expectations with same interviewer. As seen in Figure 20, there 
was no significant interaction between type of prejudice and target of prejudice on 
expectations for the job opportunity when interviewed by the same interviewer, F(4, 117) 
= 0.743, p = .565. There was also no significant main effect of type of prejudice, F(2, 
117) = 1.447, p = .239. 
 There was a significant main effect of target of prejudice on job expectations, F(2, 
117) = 4.498, p = .013. A female target resulted in significantly lower expectations of 
obtaining the job than a racial minority target, t(84) = 2.431, p = .017. However, there 
was no significant difference between a female target and a racial minority female target, 
t(88) = 1.668, p = .099, or between a racial minority target and a racial minority female 
target, t(74) = 0.691, p = .491. 
 This reflects the predominance of female participants in this study. Male 
participants showed no effect of the target of prejudice on their expectations for the job 
F(2, 37) = 0.513, p = .603, while female participants’ expectations of obtaining the job 
were influenced by the target of the prejudice expressed, F(2, 82) = 4.340, p = .016. For 
female participants, a female target resulted in significantly lower job expectations than a 
racial minority target, t(61) = 3.034, p = .004. However, there was no significant 
difference between a female target and a racial minority female target, t(62) = 1.531, p = 
.131, or between a racial minority target and a racial minority female target, t(74) = 
1.134, p = .263. 
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Figure 20. Expectation of obtaining job when interviewed by the same interviewer who 
expresses no prejudice, subtle prejudice, or blatant prejudice toward a woman, racial 
minority, or racial minority woman. 
Note. Responses were provided on a 1-7 scale. 
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 Job opportunity expectations with different interviewer. As seen in Figure 21, 
there was no significant interaction between type of prejudice and target of prejudice on 
expectations for the potential job opportunity when interviewed by a different 
interviewer, F(4, 116) = 0.119, p = .976. There was also no significant main effect of 
type of prejudice, F(2, 116) = 0.501, p = .607, and no significant main effect of target of 
prejudice, F(2, 116) = 0.068, p = . 935. 
 Protest intentions. As seen in Figure 22, there was no significant main effect of 
type of prejudice, F(2, 117) = 0.488, p = .640, and no significant main effect of target of 
prejudice, F(2, 117) = 0.840, p = .434, on intentions to protest not obtaining the job. 
 The interaction between type of prejudice and target of prejudice was significant, 
F(4, 117) = 4.181, p =.003. This reflects the demographics of the participants in the 
study, who were mostly white and female. There were no significant differences among 
intentions to protest for the racial minority female target condition, F(2, 37) = 1.121, p = 
.337. However, different patterns were observed for the female target and racial minority 
target conditions. 
 In the racial minority target condition, intention to protest did not vary among the 
types of prejudice for non-white participants, F(2, 11) = 0.440, p = .655. However, for 
white participants, intentions to protest were significantly different among the types of 
prejudice, F(2, 18) = 4.496, p = .026. White participants were significantly less likely to 
protest in the blatant racism condition than the subtle prejudice condition, t(14) = 2.654, p 
= .019. Protest intentions were not significantly different between the blatant and no 
prejudice conditions, t(11) = 0.763, p = .461, or between the subtle and no prejudice 
conditions t(11) = 1.945, p = .078. 
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Figure 21. Expectation of obtaining job when interviewed by a different interviewer at 
the same company as the interviewer who expressed no prejudice, subtle prejudice, or 
blatant prejudice toward a woman, racial minority, or racial minority woman. 
Note. Responses were provided on a 1-7 scale. 
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Figure 22. Intention to protest not obtaining a job at the company of the interviewer who 
expresses no prejudice, subtle prejudice, or blatant prejudice toward a woman, racial 
minority, or racial minority woman. 
Note. Responses were provided on a 1-7 scale. 
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 In the female target condition, intention to protest did not differ among types of 
prejudice for male participants, F(2, 8) = 0.181, p = .840. However, female participants 
indicated significantly different intentions to protest the different types of prejudice, F(2, 
39) = 5.699, p = .007. Female participants reported significantly higher intentions to 
protest blatant prejudice than subtle prejudice, t(25) = 2.354, p = .027, or than no 
prejudice, t(24) = 3.686, p = .001. There was no significant difference between subtle 
prejudice and no prejudice, t(29) = 1.034, p = .310. 
 Job Opportunity Affective Responses. 
 Affective responses to different interviewer. There were no significant 
interactions or main effects observed in negative or positive affect when individuals 
either did or did not obtain the hypothetical job after being interviewed by a different 
interviewer (all ps > .05). 
 Negative affect when not obtaining job with same interviewer. There was no 
significant interaction between type of prejudice and target of prejudice for negative 
affect experienced when participants did not receive the job after being interviewed by 
the same interviewer, F(4, 130) = 0.197, p = .940. There was also no significant main 
effect of type of prejudice, F(2, 130) = 2.267, p = .108, and no significant main effect of 
target of prejudice, F(2, 130) = 0.457, p = .634. 
 Positive affect when not obtaining job with same interviewer. There was no 
significant main effect of type of prejudice and target of prejudice for positive affect 
experienced when participants did not receive the job after being interviewed by the same 
interviewer, F(2, 127) = 0.018, p = .982, and no significant main effect of target of 
prejudice, F(2, 127) = 0.330, p = .720. The interaction between type of prejudice and 
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target of prejudice was significant, F(4, 127) = 2.512, p =.045. However, exploration of 
this interaction did not reveal any significant simple effects (all ps > .05). 
 Negative affect when obtaining job with same interviewer. There was no 
significant interaction between type of prejudice and target of prejudice for negative 
affect experienced when participants did receive the job after being interviewed by the 
interviewer, F(4, 125) = 1.878, p = .118. There was also no significant main effect of 
target of prejudice, F(2, 125) = 2.415, p = .094. 
 There was a significant main effect of type of prejudice, F(2, 125) = 3.184, p = 
.045. Significantly less negative affect was experienced in response to no prejudice than 
to subtle prejudice, t(85) = 2.273, p = .026, or to blatant prejudice, t(87) = 2.312, p = 
.023. There was no significant difference between subtle and blatant prejudice, t(90) = 
0.130, p = .897. 
 Positive affect when obtaining job with same interviewer. There was no 
significant interaction between type of prejudice and target of prejudice for positive affect 
experienced when participants did receive the job after being interviewed by the 
interviewer, F(4, 128) = 0.606, p = .659. There was also no significant main effect of 
target of prejudice, F(2, 128) = 2.230, p = .112. 
 There was a significant main effect of type of prejudice, F(2, 128) = 3.480, p = 
.034. Significantly more positive affect was experienced in response to no prejudice than 
to subtle prejudice, t(89) = 2.502, p = .014, or to blatant prejudice, t(87) = 2.963, p = 
.004. There was no significant difference between subtle and blatant prejudice, t(92) = 
0.560, p = .577. 
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 Judgements of Job Opportunity Outcome. 
 Fair treatment. There was no significant interaction between type of prejudice 
and target of prejudice for how fairly treated participants felt if they did not receive the 
job after being interviewed by the same interviewer, F(4, 129) = 0.398, p = .810. There 
was also no significant main effect of type of prejudice, F(2, 129) = 1.246, p = .291, and 
no significant main effect of target of prejudice, F(2, 129) = 0.241, p = .786. 
 There was no significant interaction between type of prejudice and target of 
prejudice for how fairly treated participants felt if they did not receive the job after being 
interviewed by a different interviewer, F(4, 129) = 0.526, p = .717. There was also no 
significant main effect of type of prejudice, F(2, 129) = 0.838, p = .435, and no 
significant main effect of target of prejudice, F(2, 129) = 1.674, p = .192. 
 Earned job on merit. There was no significant interaction between type of 
prejudice and target of prejudice for how much participants felt they earned the job on 
their own merit when they did receive the job after being interviewed by the same 
interviewer, F(4, 131) = 0.671, p = .613. There was also no significant main effect of 
type of prejudice, F(2, 131) = 1.761, p = .176. 
 There was a significant main effect of target of prejudice, F(2, 131) = 5.216, p = 
.007. Participants felt they had earned the job significantly more in the female target 
condition than the racial minority target condition, t(93) = 3.510, p = .001, or the racial 
minority female target condition, t(101) = 2.229, p = .028. There was no significant 
difference between the racial minority target and racial minority female target, t(80) = 
1.053, p = .296. 
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 When participants received the job after being interviewed by a different 
interviewer there was no significant interaction between type of prejudice and target of 
prejudice for how fairly treated participants felt, F(4, 130) = 0.425, p = .790. There was 
also no significant main effect of type of prejudice, F(2, 130) = 0.301, p = .740, and no 
significant main effect of target of prejudice, F(2, 130) = 0.314, p = .731. 
 Mediational Analysis. For the mediation analyses, type of prejudice was coded 
numerically (no prejudice = 1; subtle = 2; blatant = 3). Analyses were performed to 
examine the role of affect in mediating the relation between the different forms of 
prejudice or different targets of prejudice and recognition of discrimination in the hiring 
decision. Additionally, inverse mediation models, in which the mediator and dependent 
variable were switched, were analyzed to further explore support for the proposed 
mediation model. Finally, the role of recognition of prejudice in mediating the relation 
between the type or target of prejudice and intended responses was also examined. 
 Role of affect in recognition of discriminatory hiring decision. Affect may be an 
important cue to trigger recognition of prejudice in different forms of prejudice or it may 
be a result of recognizing prejudice. In first examining the effect of affect on recognition, 
both negative and positive affect were correlated with the type of prejudice (negative 
affect: r = .34, p < .001; positive affect: r = -.38, p < .001) as well as with recognition 
(negative affect: r = .65, p < .001; positive affect: r = -.50, p < .001) and therefore, 
qualified as potential mediators. When each was entered with type of prejudice in 
separate regression analyses, both types of affect, negative affect (β = .51, t = 8.50, p < 
.001), and positive affect (β = -.33, t = 4.72, p < .001), predicted recognition of 
discrimination. Consistent with partial mediation, the effect of the prejudice type 
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manipulation on recognition of discrimination (r = .59, p < .001) remained significant in 
each case (negative affect equation: β = .51, t = 8.50, p < .001; positive affect equation: β 
= .48, t = 6.90, p < .001), but was weaker than when it was considered as a lone predictor 
(β = .59, t = 8.69, p < .001). A test for mediation utilizing bootstrap estimation of indirect 
effects (1000 replications) confirmed each type of affect as a partial mediator, two-tailed 
ps < .05 (95% CI for negative affect indirect effect = .162, .491; positive affect = .109, 
.409). Multiple mediation analyses considering both types of affect simultaneously 
revealed significant partial mediation effects for both negative affect and positive affect, 
p < .05 (95% CI for negative affect indirect effect= .153, .472; positive affect = .053, 
.271). 
 However, affect may be an outcome of recognition of discrimination, rather than 
leading to this recognition. When recognition of discrimination was entered in a 
regression equation with the type of prejudice it predicted negative affect (β = .70, t = 
8.50, p < .001). Consistent with full mediation, the effect of the prejudice type 
manipulation on negative affect (r = .34, p < .001) did not remain significant when it was 
entered with recognition of discrimination, (β = -.08, t = 0.97, p = .333). A test for 
mediation utilizing bootstrap estimation of indirect effects (1000 replications) confirmed 
recognition of discrimination as a full mediator, two-tailed ps < .05 (95% CI for 
recognition of discrimination indirect effect = .505, .949). Similarly, when recognition of 
discrimination was entered in a regression equation with the type of prejudice it predicted 
positive affect (β = -.43, t = -4.72, p < .001). Consistent with full mediation, the effect of 
the prejudice type manipulation on positive affect (r = -.38, p < .001) did not remain 
significant when it was entered with recognition of discrimination, (β = -.12, t = 1.29, p = 
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.199). A test for mediation utilizing bootstrap estimation of indirect effects (1000 
replications) confirmed recognition of discrimination as a full mediator, two-tailed ps < 
.05 (95% CI for recognition of discrimination indirect effect = -.684, -.210). 
 Role of affect in recognition of discrimination against differing targets. Affect 
may also be an important cue to trigger recognition of prejudice in prejudice directed 
toward different targets, or it may be a result of recognizing prejudice. In first examining 
the effect of affect on recognition, only negative affect was correlated with the target of 
prejudice, while positive affect was not (negative affect: r = .26, p = .002; positive affect: 
r = -.11, p = .216) and therefore, only negative affect qualified as a potential mediator. 
When it was entered with target of prejudice in a regression analysis, negative affect 
predicted recognition of discrimination (β = .64, t = 9.37, p < .001). Consistent with full 
mediation, the effect of the prejudice target manipulation on recognition of discrimination 
(r = .23, p = .006) did not remain significant when it was entered in the regression 
equation with negative affect (β = .04, t = 0.59, p = .559). A test for mediation utilizing 
bootstrap estimation of indirect effects (1000 replications) confirmed negative affect as a 
full mediator, two-tailed ps < .05 (95% CI for negative affect indirect effect = .106, 
.504). 
 However, affect may be an outcome of recognition of discrimination, rather than 
leading to this recognition. When recognition of discrimination was entered in a 
regression equation with the target of prejudice it predicted negative affect (β = .63, t = 
9.37, p < .001). Consistent with full mediation, the effect of the prejudice target 
manipulation on negative affect (r = .26, p = .002) did not remain significant when it was 
entered with recognition of discrimination, (β = .13, t = 1.95, p = .053). A test for 
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mediation utilizing bootstrap estimation of indirect effects (1000 replications) confirmed 
recognition of discrimination as a full mediator, two-tailed ps < .05 (95% CI for 
recognition of discrimination indirect effect = .045, .397). 
 Consequences of prejudice recognition. The role of perceiving prejudice in 
mediating the effects of the different types or targets of prejudice on response intentions 
was also examined. In first examining the effect of recognition of discrimination on 
responses toward the interviewer expressing a prejudiced belief, confrontation and 
speaking to the interviewer correlated with the type of prejudice, while attempting to 
understand did not (confrontation: r = .49, p < .001; speaking: r = .36, p < .001; 
understanding: r = -.03, p = .702) and therefore, only confrontation and speaking to the 
interviewer demonstrated a relationship with the type of prejudice which may have been 
mediated. Further examination of correlations revealed that participants’ recognition of 
discrimination correlated with the type of prejudice (r = .59, p < .001) and therefore, 
qualified as a potential mediator of each relationship. When it was entered with type of 
prejudice in a regression analysis, it predicted intention to confront the interviewer (β = 
.60, t = 7.78, p < .001). Consistent with full mediation, the effect of the prejudice type 
manipulation on intentions to confront the interviewer (r = .49, p < .001) did not remain 
significant when it was entered with recognition of discrimination (β = .14, t = 1.75, p = 
.082). A test for mediation utilizing bootstrap estimation of indirect effects (1000 
replications) recognition of discrimination as a full mediator, two-tailed ps < .05 (95% CI 
for recognition of discrimination indirect effect = .427, .863). Similarly, when recognition 
of discrimination was entered with type of prejudice in a regression analysis, it predicted 
intention to speak to the interviewer (β = .67, t = 8.12, p < .001). Consistent with full 
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mediation, the effect of the prejudice type manipulation on intentions to speak to the 
interviewer (r = .36, p < .001) did not remain significant when it was entered with 
recognition of prejudice (β = -.05, t = 0.59, p = .554). A test for mediation utilizing 
bootstrap estimation of indirect effects (1000 replications) recognition of prejudice as a 
full mediator, two-tailed ps < .05 (95% CI for recognition of prejudice indirect effect = 
.603, 1.216). 
 In first examining the effect of recognition of prejudice on responses toward the 
interviewer expressing a prejudiced belief, only confrontation correlated with the target 
of prejudice, while intending to speak to the interviewer and attempting to understand did 
not (confrontation: r = .26, p = .002; speaking: r = .16, p = .052; understanding: r = .002, 
p = .985) and therefore, only confrontation demonstrated a relationship with the target of 
prejudice which may have been mediated. Further examination of correlations revealed 
that participants’ recognition of recognition correlated with the target of prejudice (r = 
.23, p = .006) and therefore, qualified as a potential mediator of the relationship. When it 
was entered with target of prejudice in a regression analysis, it predicted intention to 
confront the interviewer (β = .65, t = 10.26, p < .001). Consistent with full mediation, the 
effect of the prejudice target manipulation on intentions to confront the interviewer (r = 
.26, p = .002) did not remain significant when it was entered with recognition of 
discrimination (β = .11, t = 1.77, p = .078). A test for mediation utilizing bootstrap 
estimation of indirect effects (1000 replications) recognition of discrimination as a full 
mediator, two-tailed ps < .05 (95% CI for recognition of discrimination indirect effect = 
.085, .447). 
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 Again, the inverse models of these mediation relationships were not tested due to 
them lacking conceptual meaning. 
Discussion 
 This study demonstrated several interesting outcomes of different expressions of 
prejudice. First, this study replicated the finding from the previous studies that subtle 
prejudice is less recognizable as prejudice compared to blatant prejudice, and therefore 
results in less negative responses. In this study, it was demonstrated that this occurs even 
when the discriminatory outcome resulting from subtle or blatant prejudice is the same. 
 This study also confirmed that sexism is recognized as prejudice to a lesser extent 
than racism. Further, individuals experience less negative affective responses as a result 
of sexism than racism and report less intention to confront a sexist individual than a racist 
individual. 
 The current study also demonstrated that there is not an additive effect of 
prejudices on recognition of prejudice or responses to prejudice. Prejudice directed 
toward a racial minority woman did not result in responses that differed in strength than 
those resulting from prejudice toward a racial minority man. There were no differences in 
recognition of prejudice, affective responses, or intentions to confront the prejudiced 
individual. 
 This study also replicated the finding that a potential consequence of lesser 
recognition of subtle prejudice, as well as of sexism, is that individuals have less 
intention to confront the prejudiced individual. 
 As well, this study demonstrated the role that affect, most particularly negative 
affect, may play in recognizing prejudice and discrimination. However, again it was 
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unclear whether negative affect leads to recognition of prejudice or the inverse is the case 
and recognition of prejudice leads to negative affective responses. 
 However, this study did not demonstrate that perceptions of prejudice and 
discrimination had a strong impact on responses to a potential personal job opportunity at 
the company where the prejudiced hiring decision was made. There was no effect 
observed on intentions to apply for the potential job, how likely individuals thought they 
would be to receive the job if they were interviewed by a different interviewer, affect in 
response to not getting the job with a different interviewer, how fairly treated they would 
feel if they didn’t receive the job, or how much they had earned the job on their own 
merit if they were interviewed by a different interviewer. 
 Despite this limited reaction to the potential job opportunity, some notable effects 
did emerge. Women had less expectation of receiving the job if they were interviewed by 
the interviewer who had not hired a woman previously. An impact on intentions to 
protest was also observed. Women were more likely to protest if they were interviewed 
by a blatant sexist and White individuals were less likely to protest if they were 
interviewed by a blatant racist. As well, individuals experienced more negative and less 
positive affect if they received the job from a prejudiced interviewer. Individuals also felt 
that they had earned the job more on their own merit when the interviewer had previously 
not hired a woman, rather than a racial minority individual. 
 This pattern of responding to the hypothetical job opportunity suggests that 
individuals are not inclined to avoid a situation where they either may face discrimination 
or benefit from someone else being discriminated against. However, women in particular 
seem to recognize that they would be disadvantaged by a sexist individual, although men 
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to not perceive that they are advantaged. White individuals, though, do appear to have 
some recognition that they are at an advantage from racism. 
 Therefore, this study demonstrates that the subtlety of prejudice, as well as the 
target of prejudice, plays an important role in responses to the prejudice. It demonstrates 
that there are significant consequences of contemporary prejudice, such as less 
motivation to challenge prejudice, even when there is obvious discrimination resulting 
from contemporary prejudicial attitudes. 
General Discussion 
Responses to Subtle and Blatant Prejudice 
 The current research firmly established that individuals have different responses 
to subtle and blatant expressions of prejudice. As anticipated based on previous research 
which has demonstrated that there can be differing recognition of subtle and blatant 
sexism (Barreto & Ellemers, 2005a; Barreto & Ellemers, 2005b) and resultant differing 
intentions to challenge subtle sexism compared to blatant sexism (Ellemers & Barreto, 
2009; Becker & Wright, 2011), the current research showed that individuals are less able 
to recognize subtle prejudice as being prejudice compared to blatant prejudice and as a 
result are less willing to challenge subtle prejudice than to challenge blatant prejudice. 
This research demonstrated that this effect extends beyond sexism to other forms of 
prejudice such as racism. Additionally, consistent with previous research, individuals 
experienced greater hostility and anger in response to blatant prejudice compared to 
subtle prejudice. Further, while previous research (e.g., Barreto & Ellemers, 2005a) has 
used personal endorsements to support the claim that subtle prejudice is more acceptable 
in society than is blatant prejudice, the present research directly measured beliefs 
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regarding societal acceptability and found that subtle prejudice is perceived to be viewed 
more favourably in society. 
 However, some discrepancies were observed between the present research and 
some previous research. Previous research has found gender differences in affect in 
response to subtle and blatant prejudice, with females experiencing greater anxiety in 
response to subtle prejudice, and males experiencing greater anxiety in response to 
blatant prejudice (Barreto & Ellemers, 2005a). In the present research both males and 
females experienced greater negative affect, including anxiety, in response to blatant 
prejudice, whether racism or sexism. 
 Further, the current research extended past research by demonstrating that the 
distinction between subtle and blatant prejudice is not context-dependent. Rather, it is the 
nature of subtle expressions of prejudice, relative to blatant expressions, that is 
responsible for the differing responses, as these different responses emerge even when 
subtle and blatant prejudiced expressions are presented entirely free of context. Thus, the 
expressions of prejudice themselves are important factors that contribute to individuals’ 
responses to subtle and blatant prejudice. 
 Additionally, while previous research has only compared subtle and blatant 
sexism, the current research establishes that the effect of subtlety of expressions of 
prejudice on individuals’ responses is not specific to sexism. Rather, the differentiation 
between subtle and blatant prejudice extends to other targets of prejudice as well. The 
present research demonstrated that differing responses also occur for subtle and blatant 
racism and are not a unique element of sexism. Thus, the observed effects appear to result 
from the fundamental nature of contemporary prejudice. This further suggests that this 
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effect may further extend to targets of prejudice other than women and racial minorities 
as well. This can be examined in future research.  
 Overall, despite the differences between subtle and blatant prejudice, individuals 
still tended to respond negatively to subtle prejudice, although to a lesser extent than 
blatant prejudice. However, it is unclear to what extent this represented true negative 
responses rather than suspicion based on the experimental setting, as there were often 
only small differences between responses to subtle prejudice and responses to non-
prejudiced decisions. While differences did emerge for the recognition of prejudice in 
subtle discrimination versus non-discrimination, there was little difference in intended 
behaviour in response to these situations or negative affect experienced as a result of 
these situations. Further, particularly in the case of subtle sexism, responses sometimes 
tended to be slightly positive. This suggests that responses to subtle prejudice are not 
simply weaker versions of responding to blatant prejudice, but rather, that individuals 
view subtle prejudice as different from blatant prejudice. 
Responses to Sexism and Racism 
 An additional effect consistently observed throughout the present research was 
that responses to prejudice also differed depending on the target of the prejudice. Strong 
evidence was found indicating that individuals recognize sexism less than they recognize 
racism, and therefore have less intention to confront sexism than racism. However, it was 
established that this effect is not a result of different stereotypes about women expressed 
in sexist beliefs compared to the stereotypes of racial minorities expressed in racist 
beliefs. In fact, when racist and sexist expressions were identical except for the target 
there was still a distinction between responses to sexism and racism. Thus, discrimination 
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based on subtle sexism was less of a concern than discrimination based on subtle racism, 
while discrimination based on blatant sexism was of less concern than discrimination 
based on blatant racism. Although there is little previous research directly comparing 
responses to sexism relative to other forms of prejudice, the observed effect is consistent 
with some previous research which has found a greater perception of prejudice and 
discrimination for racism compared to sexism (Cowan & Hodge, 1996; Rodin et al., 
1990). 
 The current research extends this previous research by further demonstrating that 
the distinction between racism and sexism is not limited to recognition, but also is 
observed for cognitions and affect, as well as behavioural intentions in response to 
sexism and racism. While some research has observed specific differences in responses to 
sexism and racism, this research has been of limited scope, such that the full extent of 
these differences was unclear. The present research demonstrates differences in responses 
to sexism and racism that have not previously been observed. Previously, differences 
between sexism and racism have been observed for recognition of hate speech (Cowan & 
Hodge, 1996), recognition of discrimination (Rodin et al., 1990), and recognition of bias 
(Czopp & Monteith, 2003). The current research demonstrates that the differences 
between racism and sexism also extend to potential consequences of recognition of 
prejudice. Individuals anticipated that sexist beliefs would result in discrimination or 
other negative outcomes to a lesser extent than would racist beliefs. Sexist beliefs were 
further anticipated to have neutral or potentially even positive outcomes to a greater 
extent than racist beliefs. Individuals also reported less negative affect in response to 
  
114 
sexist discrimination compared to racist discrimination. Further, individuals had less 
intention to confront sexism than to confront racism. 
Additionally, there has been little research that sheds light on why individuals 
would have different responses to sexism and racism, even when the expressions of 
prejudice are identical and therefore do not differ in terms of the stereotypes expressed. It 
may be that gender stereotypes are perceived as more factual and accurate than racial 
stereotypes, so that inequalities between men and women are more likely than 
inequalities between racial minorities and Whites to be seen as legitimate and therefore 
not a result of prejudice (Czopp & Monteith, 2003). This explanation was not specifically 
explored in relation to the differential responses observed in the present research. While it 
was demonstrated that individuals cite the accuracy of sexist beliefs as a reason for not 
viewing them as prejudice, it is still unclear if this is a true antecedent of the recognition 
of prejudice or simply a justification. Thus, this question is an important issue for future 
research to directly explore.  
Societal Implications 
 These distinctions between subtle and blatant prejudice as well as between sexism 
and racism suggest that despite egalitarianism and non-discrimination being endorsed as 
important values in our society, individuals are unlikely to challenge many of the 
inequalities that persist today. Blatant prejudice and discrimination are not the norm in 
contemporary society. Rather, subtle biases and systemic discrimination continue to 
perpetuate inequality (Dovidio, 2001). It is just such subtle inequality that the current 
research demonstrates is likely to go unrecognized and thus, unchallenged. This is 
particularly concerning given that subtle forms of prejudice still represent the same 
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underlying negative attitudes toward racial minorities or women as more blatant forms of 
prejudice that are now considered unacceptable in contemporary society. Thus, modern 
expressions of prejudice can be used in almost any situation to allow for discrimination to 
occur and pass unchallenged. 
 Therefore, this threat to egalitarianism posed by subtle prejudice suggests that 
there is a need to enhance recognition of contemporary prejudice, so that equality can 
continue to be enhanced in our society. Interventions informing individuals of the nature 
of contemporary prejudice may prove effective to enhance recognition and action in 
response to subtle prejudice. Specifically, information and education regarding the 
inaccuracy of subtle prejudiced beliefs and the negative impact they can have on the 
targeted social group may promote recognition of subtle prejudice. Given the important 
role of recognition of prejudice consistently demonstrated in the current studies, it may be 
that education regarding what constitutes prejudice is key to prompting action, as 
individuals appear to be limited in their understanding and recognition of prejudice to 
only blatant forms of prejudice. Future research should explore the effectiveness of these 
types of interventions further. This is of particular importance as simply improving 
attitudes toward minorities, as many traditional interventions designed to promote 
equality have done, may in fact be insufficient to enhance equality in contemporary 
society. Indeed, interventions based on intergroup contact have even been demonstrated 
to reduce efforts to push for equality (Saguy, Tausch, Dovidio, & Pratto, 2009). 
Limitations and Future Research Directions 
 Some further questions remain unanswered by the current research. The 
generalizability of the current findings remains to be explored further. Studies conducted 
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using a general population sample, including individuals with weaker norms against 
blatant prejudice could provide additional insights into antecedents and consequences of 
recognition of prejudice. Additionally, the current research was limited to assessing 
behavioural intentions, rather than actual behaviours. Future research including 
behavioural measures will be beneficial to assess the extent of the impact that the limited 
recognition of subtle prejudice may have on endeavours to reduce prejudice and 
discrimination in contemporary society.  
 Another issue that remains to be addressed in further research is the role of beliefs 
that discrimination will result from different forms of prejudice. In Study 3, individuals 
expected that discrimination was less likely to result from subtle prejudice or sexism 
compared to blatant prejudice or racism. They further frequently reported a lack of 
negative outcomes, or even the presence of positive outcomes, as a reason for not 
defining subtle expressions of prejudice as prejudice. This would suggest that differing 
responses to different forms of prejudice may be a result of differing beliefs of the 
seriousness of the outcomes of the different forms of prejudice. However, as shown in 
Study 4, even when discriminatory outcomes of subtle prejudice or sexism are identical 
to those of blatant prejudice or racism, individuals still demonstrate less concern about 
the prejudice. This shows that beliefs regarding the likelihood of discrimination occurring 
may serve as a justification for a lesser response to some forms of prejudice compared to 
others, rather than a root cause of differential responding. This supposition is consistent 
with theorizing on modern racism and sexism that suggests that these forms of prejudice 
reflect negative affect and prejudice toward racial minorities and women and are used to 
justify discrimination against these groups. Modern prejudice permits the expression of 
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negative attitudes toward racial minorities and women by creating an ambivalent 
situation where prejudice and discrimination can be attributed to nonprejudiced 
ideologies and explanations (McConahay, 1986; Swim et al., 1995). Future research 
should directly examine the possibility that beliefs about discrimination resulting from 
different forms of prejudice serve a justification role. 
 An additional issue that remains unanswered by the present research is how 
responses differ depending on the role that the observer of discrimination plays in the 
situation. In the current studies individuals were given a choice between taking action to 
challenge prejudice and discrimination or taking no action at all. However, in real world 
settings, individuals may be faced with a different choice – that of challenging 
discrimination or actively participating in it. For instance, in a situation equivalent to that 
used in Study 4, where an individual was reviewing a hiring decision and the reasons for 
it, real-world individuals who would have access to this information would often be a 
manager or other superior who is required to either approve or overrule the decision. 
Thus, if they do not confront the prejudice and discrimination they must condone it and 
actively support it. It would therefore be interesting to observe individuals’ responses 
when not challenging prejudice would result in them perpetuating it and directly harming 
an individual based on this prejudice. 
 It is particularly interesting to note the lack of gender and race differences 
observed throughout these studies. It may have been expected that women and racial 
minorities would be more sensitive to subtle prejudice and more willing to challenge it, 
as they would directly benefit from the reduction of subtle prejudice. However, that was 
not observed in the current research. In subtle prejudice situations where they would 
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receive less support from others who may have better recognized and supported claims of 
blatant discrimination, women and racial minorities may have anticipated greater 
interpersonal and social costs associated with claiming prejudice and discrimination were 
occurring. This possibility was not explored in the current research. Therefore, further 
research in this area is required. Studies with greater representation of men and racial 
minorities, and thus greater power to detect gender and race differences, should be 
conducted to confirm that men and women, as well as Whites and racial minorities, do 
indeed respond in the same manner to subtle prejudice. Once this is confirmed, further 
studies should explore the reasons for similar responding despite the fact that one group 
is harmed and the other benefits from subtle prejudice. On the other hand, if future 
studies do identify gender and racial differences in responding to subtle prejudice, it 
would be useful to explore the factors that contribute to some groups being better able to 
identify subtle prejudice, as this could be incorporated into interventions intended to 
promote recognition of prejudice. 
 Finally, another important topic that requires further examination in future 
research is the exact model of the sequence of responses to subtle versus blatant prejudice 
and to sexism versus racism. Previous research has suggested different models of 
mediation effects. For example, some research has suggested that negative affect is an 
antecedent of recognition of prejudice (Barreto & Ellemers, 2005a), whereas other 
research has suggested that negative affect is a consequence of recognition of prejudice, 
mediating its effect on intentions to challenge prejudice (Becker & Wright, 2011; 
Ellemers & Barreto, 2009). The present research was unable to resolve this discrepancy, 
as support was found for both roles. Therefore, future research designed to allow for 
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statistical modeling techniques to be employed should be conducted to address this issue. 
However, it may also be the case that negative affect can be both an antecedent and 
consequence of recognition of prejudice so that both paths are valid. 
Conclusion 
 The present research examined responses to subtle and blatant expressions of 
prejudice. Across four studies it was demonstrated that individuals consistently 
recognized subtle prejudice less than blatant prejudice and therefore were less willing to 
take action to challenge subtle prejudice compared to blatant prejudice. This occurred 
irrespective of whether the outcomes of this prejudice were described as equivalent. 
Thus, the research demonstrates that despite the value placed on egalitarianism in 
contemporary society, changing the expression of prejudice can make it much more 
acceptable. Subtle prejudice reflects the same underlying negativity as blatant prejudice 
and can result in the same discriminatory outcomes. Given that subtle prejudice is more 
common in contemporary society than is blatant prejudice, this suggests that much 
prejudice and discrimination today is unremarked and unchallenged, allowing unfair 
inequality to persist.  
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Appendix A 
Study 1 Materials 
Old Fashioned Sexism Items 
1. Women are generally not as smart as men. 
 
2. I would be less comfortable having a woman as a boss as a man. 
 
3. It is more important to encourage boys than to encourage girls to participate in 
athletics. 
 
4. Women are not as capable of thinking logically as men. 
 
5. When both parents are employed and their child gets sick at school, the school should 
call the mother rather than the father. 
Modern Sexism Items 
1. Discrimination against women is no longer a problem in Canada. 
 
2. Women rarely miss out on good jobs due to sexual discrimination. 
 
3. It is rare to see women treated in a sexist manner on television. 
 
4. On average, people in our society treat husbands and wives equally. 
 
5. Society has reached the point where women and men have equal opportunities for 
achievement. 
 
6. It is difficult to understand the anger of women's groups in Canada. 
 
7. It is difficult to understand why women's groups are still concerned about societal 
limitations of women's opportunities. 
 
8. Over the past few years, the government and news media have been showing more 
concern about the treatment of women than is warranted by women's actual 
experiences. 
Hostile Sexism Items 
1. Many women are actually seeking special favours, such as hiring policies that favour 
them over men, under the guise of asking for "equality." 
 
2. Most women interpret innocent remarks or acts as being sexist. 
 
3. Women are too easily offended. 
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4. Feminists are seeking for women to have more power than men. 
 
5. Most women fail to appreciate fully all that men do for them. 
 
6. Women seek to gain power by getting control over men. 
 
7. Women exaggerate problems they have at work. 
 
8. Once a woman gets a man to commit to her, she usually tries to put him on a tight 
leash. 
 
9. When women lose to men in a fair competition, they typically complain about being 
discriminated against. 
 
10. There are actually many women who get a kick out of teasing men by seeming 
sexually available and then refusing male advances. 
 
11. Feminists are making entirely unreasonable demands of men. 
Benevolent Sexism Items 
1. No matter how accomplished he is, a man is not truly complete as a person unless he 
has the love of a woman. 
 
2. In a disaster, women ought to be rescued before men. 
 
3. People are rarely truly happy in life without being romantically involved with a 
member of the other sex. 
 
4. Many women have a quality of purity that few men possess. 
 
5. Women should be cherished and protected by men. 
 
6. Every man ought to have a woman whom he adores. 
 
7. Men are not complete without women. 
 
8. A good woman should be set on a pedestal by her man. 
 
9. Women, compared to men, tend to have a superior moral sensibility. 
 
10. Men should be willing to sacrifice their own well being in order to provide financially 
for the women in their lives. 
 
11. Women, as compared to men, tend to have a more refined sense of culture and good 
taste. 
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Dependent Measures 
 
Societal Perceptions 
Indicate how much each of the following describes the statement above on a scale of 1 
(not at all) to 7 (very). 
 
1. Prejudice 
2. Positive belief to hold 
3. Acceptable in society 
4. Appropriate 
5. Encouraged by society 
 
Affect 
Indicate how much each of the following describes how you feel in response to the 
statement above on a scale of 1 (not at all) to 7 (very). 
 
1. Angry 
2. Weak 
3. Happy 
4. Indignant 
5. Tense 
6. Secure 
7. Disappointed 
8. Sad 
9. Content 
 
Behavioural Intentions 
Indicate how much each of the following describes how you would want to respond to an 
individual who endorsed the statement above on a scale of 1 (not at all) to 7 (very). 
 
1. I would wish to speak to someone who holds this view 
2. I would want to try to change the opinion of an individual with this view 
3. I would try to understand why an individual would hold this view 
4. I would expect that I would dislike an individual with this view 
5. I would be unwilling to collaborate with an individual who endorsed this view 
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Appendix B 
Study 2 Materials 
Old Fashioned Racism Items 
1. Racial minorities are generally not as smart as whites. 
 
2. I oppose laws that permit racial minorities to rent or purchase housing even when the 
person offering the property for sale or rent does not wish to rent or sell it to racial 
minorities. 
 
3. Generally speaking, I oppose full racial integration. 
 
4. I am opposed to open or fair housing laws. 
 
5. It is a bad idea for whites to marry racial minorities. 
 
6. If a racial minority family with about the same income and education as I have moved 
next door, I would mind it a great deal. 
 
7. It is wrong for racial segregation to be illegal. 
 
Modern Racism Items 
1. Over the past few years, the government and news media have shown more respect 
for racial minorities than they deserve. 
 
2. It is difficult to understand the anger of racial minorities in Canada. 
 
3. Discrimination against racial minorities is no longer a problem in Canada. 
 
4. Over the past few years, racial minorities have gotten more economically than they 
deserve. 
 
5. Racial minorities have more influence on government policies than they ought to 
have. 
 
6. Racial minorities are getting too demanding in their push for equal rights. 
 
7. Racial minorities should not push themselves where they are not wanted. 
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Dependent Measures 
 
Societal Perceptions 
Indicate how much each of the following describes the statement above on a scale of 1 
(not at all) to 7 (very). 
 
1. Prejudice 
2. Positive belief to hold 
3. Acceptable in society 
4. Appropriate 
5. Encouraged by society 
 
Affect 
Indicate how much each of the following describes how you feel in response to the 
statement above on a scale of 1 (not at all) to 7 (very). 
 
1. Angry 
2. Weak 
3. Happy 
4. Indignant 
5. Tense 
6. Secure 
7. Disappointed 
8. Sad 
9. Content 
 
Behavioural Intentions 
Indicate how much each of the following describes how you would want to respond to an 
individual who endorsed the statement above on a scale of 1 (not at all) to 7 (very). 
 
1. I would wish to speak to someone who holds this view 
2. I would want to try to change the opinion of an individual with this view 
3. I would try to understand why an individual would hold this view 
4. I would expect that I would dislike an individual with this view 
5. I would be unwilling to collaborate with an individual who endorsed this view 
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Appendix C 
Study 3 Materials 
Selected Old Fashioned Sexism Items 
1. Women are generally not as smart as men. 
 
2. I would be less comfortable having a woman as a boss as a man. 
 
3. When both parents are employed and their child gets sick at school, the school should 
call the mother rather than the father. 
Selected Modern Sexism Items 
1. Discrimination against women is no longer a problem in Canada. 
 
2. It is difficult to understand why women's groups are still concerned about societal 
limitations of women's opportunities. 
 
3. Over the past few years, the government and news media have been showing more 
concern about the treatment of women than is warranted by women's actual 
experiences. 
Selected Hostile Sexism Items 
1. Feminists are seeking for women to have more power than men. 
 
2. Most women fail to appreciate fully all that men do for them. 
 
3. Once a woman gets a man to commit to her, she usually tries to put him on a tight 
leash. 
 
Selected Benevolent Sexism Items 
1. Women should be cherished and protected by men. 
 
2. Every man ought to have a woman whom he adores. 
 
3. Women, as compared to men, tend to have a more refined sense of culture and good 
taste. 
 
Selected Old Fashioned Racism Items 
1. Generally speaking, I oppose full racial integration. 
 
2. It is a bad idea for whites to marry racial minorities. 
 
3. Racial minorities are generally not as smart as whites. 
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Selected Modern Racism Items 
1. Racial minorities are getting too demanding in their push for equal rights. 
 
2. Over the past few years, racial minorities have gotten more economically than they 
deserve. 
 
3. Discrimination against racial minorities is no longer a problem in Canada. 
 
Dependent Measures 
 
Do you think this statement is [sexist/racist]? 
     1 (Definitely is not)                7 (Definitely is) 
 
Why do you or do you not define this statement as [sexist/racist]? 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Could the underlying reason for endorsing this statement reflect [sexism/racism]? 
     1 (Definitely could not)         7 (Definitely could) 
 
If someone endorsed this statement, how likely do you think it would be that the 
underlying reason was [sexism/racism]? 
     1 (Not at all likely)                7 (Definitely likely) 
 
What do you think could be outcomes of endorsing this statement on treatment of 
[women/racial minorities]? 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Do you think endorsing this statement could result in discrimination? 
     1 (Definitely could not)        7 (Definitely could) 
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Appendix D 
Study 4 Materials 
Job Description 
 Job Description – Project Manager  
Description  
The role of the Project Manager is to plan, execute, and finalize projects according to strict deadlines 
and within budget. This includes acquiring resources and coordinating the efforts of team members 
and third-party contractors or consultants in order to deliver projects according to plan. The Project 
Manager will also define the project’s objectives and oversee quality control throughout its life cycle.  
Responsibilities  
 Direct and manage project development from beginning to end.  
 Define project scope, goals and deliverables that support business goals in collaboration with 
senior management and stakeholders.   
 Develop full-scale project plans and associated communications documents.   
 Effectively communicate project expectations to team members and stakeholders in a timely 
and clear fashion.  
 Estimate the resources and participants needed to achieve project goals.  
 Draft and submit budget proposals, and recommend subsequent budget changes where 
necessary.  
 Set and manage project expectations with team members and other stakeholders.  
 Delegate tasks and responsibilities to appropriate personnel.  
 Identify and resolve issues and conflicts within the project team.  
 Plan and schedule project timelines and milestones using appropriate tools.  
 Develop and deliver progress reports, proposals, and presentations.  
 Coach, mentor, motivate and supervise project team members and contractors, and influence 
them to take positive action and accountability for their assigned work.  
 
Position Requirements 
 Bachelor’s degree in project management, business administration, or related field.  
 At least 3 years direct work experience in a project management capacity, including all 
aspects of process development and execution.  
 Strong familiarity with project management software, such as Microsoft Project.  
 Demonstrated experience in personnel management.  
 Experience at working both independently and in a team-oriented, collaborative environment. 
 Can conform to shifting priorities, demands and timelines through analytical and problem-
solving capabilities.  
 React to project adjustments and alterations promptly and efficiently.  
 Ability to read communication styles of team members and contractors who come from a 
broad spectrum of disciplines.  
 Persuasive, encouraging, and motivating.  
 Ability to elicit cooperation from a wide variety of sources, including upper management, 
clients, and other departments.  
 Ability to defuse tension among project team, should it arise.  
 Strong written and oral communication skills.  
 Strong interpersonal skills.  
 Customer service skills an asset.  
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Resume – Version 1 (counterbalanced Rejected/Accepted Candidate Resume) 
 
127 Outerbridge Street 
Windsor, Ontario N6C 3R7 
 
Home: (519) 968-1804 
Cell: (519) 560-1781 
abenson@kintex.ca 
 
Avery Benson 
Objective To obtain a challenging and rewarding position as Project Manager. 
 
Experience 2007–present Kintex Industries Windsor, ON 
Project Manager 
 Consolidated three divisions of a project management team, while still 
meeting high production goals, resulting in an annual savings of $1.1M. 
 Directed and coordinated activities of projects through delegated 
members of project teams. 
 Implemented training course for new recruits — increasing profitability. 
 
2006–2007 Investindustrial Toronto, ON 
Project Manager 
 Designed model to more accurately predict project costs. 
 Increased productivity of field work force by 38 percent, and reduced 
overall costs by 17% through increased efficiency. 
 
2002–2006 Vox Technologies Toronto, ON 
Senior Sales Representative 
 Expanded sales team from 50 to 100 representatives. 
 Tripled division revenues for each sales associate. 
 Expanded sales to include mass-market accounts. 
 
1997–2002 Lit Ware, Inc. Toronto, ON 
Sales Representative 
 Received company’s highest sales award four years in a row. 
 Developed Excellence in Sales training course. 
 
Education 
 
1997–2001 University of Toronto Toronto, ON 
 B.A., Business Administration and Computer Science. 
  
References References available upon request 
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Resume – Version 2 (counterbalanced as Rejected/Accepted Candidate Resume) 
 
38 Doyle Street 
London, Ontario N5A 8P1 
 
Home: (519) 234-1976 
Cell: (519) 643-4347 
jordan.leith@pinnacle.ca 
Jordan Leith 
Objective Seeking a project management position with leadership responsibilities 
including problem solving, planning, organizing and managing budgets. 
Experience 2006–present Pinnacle Software London, ON 
Executive Program Director 
 Responsible and accountable for the coordinated management of 
multiple related projects directed toward strategic business and other 
organizational objectives.  
 Build credibility, establish rapport, and maintain communication with 
stakeholders at multiple levels, including those external to the 
organization.  
 Define and initiate projects, and assign Project Managers to manage 
cost, schedule, and performance of component projects, while working 
to ensure the ultimate success and acceptance of the program.  
 
2004–2006 Schlumberger Group London, ON 
Director, Project Management 
 Increased the company’s growth by securing new partners, consulting 
engagements and by delivering new projects.  
 Responsible for program and portfolio management activities within 
the Sales and Marketing division.  
 Mentored staff in methodology and consulting excellence and 
encouraged best practice in project management and project planning. 
 
2000–2004 Cap Gemini Ernst & Young Toronto, ON 
Consultant Manager 
 Responsible for the recruiting, management and career development of 
consulting staff.  
 Developed project plans and assumed responsibility for project profit 
and loss.  
 Monitored project activities and advised staff of issues due to resource 
availability. 
Education 1996–2000 York University Toronto, ON 
 B.A., Business Administration and Communication Studies. 
References References available upon request 
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Picture of Unsuccessful Job Candidate  
 
   
 
Picture of Successful Job Candidate 
 
 
 
Manipulation of Type of Prejudiced Hiring Decision 
Nonprejudice Condition 
Employment Decision:  Application Rejected – Not Hired 
Interviewer Explanation for Hiring Decision: 
I do not recommend that the company hire this applicant. Although the candidate had 
pretty good credentials, I decided to offer the job to another candidate who seemed to 
have more potential to successfully manage the team. After contacting references there 
was some indication that there had recently been bad experiences with this individual. 
This individual may be unmotivated, unprofessional, and overall a poor employee. It 
takes a lot of effort to train a new manager, and I’m not willing to invest that time into 
someone with such a poor track record of success. 
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Subtle Prejudice Condition 
Employment Decision:  Application Rejected – Not Hired 
Interviewer Explanation for Hiring Decision: 
I do not recommend that the company hire this applicant. Although the candidate had 
pretty good credentials, I decided to offer the job to another candidate who seemed to 
have more potential to successfully manage the team. While affirmative action policies 
indicate that this individual should be hired, discrimination against [black 
women/blacks/women] is no longer a problem in Canada so these policies are no longer 
necessary. Society has reached the point where [black women/blacks/women] and [white 
men/whites/men] have equal opportunities for achievement. Recently, I’ve had bad 
experiences with people hired under these policies. If they can’t achieve success without 
these policies they’re probably unmotivated, unprofessional, and overall poor employees. 
It takes a lot of effort to train a new manager, and I’m not willing to invest that time into 
someone who might have a poorer track record of success than another qualified 
candidate. 
 
Blatant Prejudice Condition 
Employment Decision:  Application Rejected – Not Hired 
Interviewer Explanation for Hiring Decision: 
I do not recommend that the company hire this applicant. Although the candidate had 
pretty good credentials, I decided to offer the job to another candidate who seemed to 
have more potential to successfully manage the team. Recently, I’ve had bad experiences 
with [black female/black/female] employees. [Black women/Blacks/Women] tend to be 
unmotivated, unprofessional, and overall poor employees. It takes a lot of effort to train a 
new manager, and I’m not willing to invest that time into someone from a group with 
such a poor track record of success. 
 
Dependent Measures 
 
Please answer the following questions on a scale from 1 to 7. 
1. Should unsuccessful job candidate accept or protest hiring decision? 
       1(Definitely should accept)                         7 (Definitely should protest) 
2. Should the interviewer’s decision be accepted or changed? 
       1(Definitely should be accepted)                7 (Definitely should be protested) 
3. Would you support the job candidate protesting the decision? 
1 (Definitely would not support)                   7 (Definitely would support) 
4. Do you believe the job candidate would be successful if they protested the hiring 
decision? 
1 (Definitely would not be successful)         7 (Definitely would be successful) 
5. Do you believe that discrimination played a role in the hiring decision? 
1 (Definitely did not play a role)                   7 (Definitely did play a role) 
 
Indicate how much each of the following describes how you feel in response to the 
employment decision on a scale of 1 (not at all) to 7 (very). 
1. Angry 
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2. Weak 
3. Happy 
4. Indignant 
5. Tense 
6. Secure 
7. Disappointed 
8. Sad 
9. Content 
 
Indicate how much each of the following describes how you would feel if the job 
candidate protested the employment decision on a scale of 1 (not at all) to 7 (very). 
1. Angry 
2. Weak 
3. Happy 
4. Indignant 
5. Tense 
6. Secure 
7. Disappointed 
8. Sad 
9. Content 
 
Indicate how much each of the following describes how you would want to respond to 
the interviewer about their reason for their employment decision on a scale of 1 (not at 
all) to 7 (very). 
1. I would wish to speak to the interviewer about their decision 
2. I would want to try to change the opinion of the interviewer about their decision 
3. I would try to understand why the interviewer would hold this view 
4. I would expect that I would dislike the interviewer 
5. I would be unwilling to collaborate with the interviewer 
 
Imagine there was a job opening for a position you were qualified for at the same 
company that you just viewed the employment decision from. 
1. How much would you want to apply for this position?    1(Not at all)    7 (Very much) 
2. How much would you want to work for this company?   1(Not at all)    7 (Very much) 
3. How likely do you think you would be to get the job if you were interviewed by the 
same interviewer as the job candidate?               1 (Not at all likely)     7 (Very likely) 
4. How likely do you think you would be to get the job if you were interviewed by a 
different interviewer?                                          1 (Not at all likely)     7 (Very likely) 
5. If you were interviewed by the same interviewer and did not receive the job, how 
likely would you be to protest?                          1 (Not at all likely)     7 (Very likely) 
6. If you were interviewed by a different interviewer and did not receive the job, how 
likely would you be to protest?                           1 (Not at all likely)     7 (Very likely) 
7. If you were interviewed by the same interviewer and did not receive the job, how 
would you feel? 
a. Angry 
b. Weak 
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c. Happy 
d. Indignant 
e. Tense 
f. Secure 
g. Disappointed 
h. Sad 
i. Content 
j. Treated fairly 
8. If you were interviewed by a different interviewer and did not receive the job, how 
would you feel? 
a. Angry 
b. Weak 
c. Happy 
d. Indignant 
e. Tense 
f. Secure 
g. Disappointed 
h. Sad 
i. Content 
j. Treated fairly 
9. If you were interviewed by the same interviewer and did receive the job, how would 
you feel? 
a. Angry 
b. Weak 
c. Happy 
d. Indignant 
e. Tense 
f. Secure 
g. Disappointed 
h. Sad 
i. Content 
j. Earned job on own merits 
10. If you were interviewed by a different interviewer and did receive the job, how would 
feel? 
a. Angry 
b. Weak 
c. Happy 
d. Indignant 
e. Tense 
f. Secure 
g. Disappointed 
h. Sad 
i. Content 
j. Earned job on own merits 
 
  
138 
Appendix E 
Ethics Approval Studies 1 & 2 
 
  
139 
Appendix F 
Ethics Approval Study 3 
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